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MAKING MEANING: TOWARDS A
NARRATIVE THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL
JUSTIFICATION
RANDY D. GORDON*
ABSTRACT
The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting
law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet
functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This
article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process.
To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from
civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their
decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though
often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless
sometimes revealed when a judge narrates legislative history. I conclude by
remarking that a narrative theory of interpretation and justification may have
universal relevance.
Key words: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
RICO, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, antitrust extraterritoriality, legal theory,
interpretation, justification, narrative, narrativity, history, legislative history,
statutory purpose, legislative intent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutes that are open textured (like the Sherman Act) or vague (like
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)) present
complicated questions of interpretation and application. RICO is especially
difficult because it has a multi-layered structure threaded with (sometimes
defined) concepts invented for this statute alone. To state a civil RICO claim,
a plaintiff must show that he was injured "by reason of' a criminal RICO
violation, which entails pleading such a violation, and in turn requiring him
to identify the predicate commission of certain specified crimes (e.g., mail or
wire fraud) and to satisfy certain defined terms (e.g., pleading the existence
*Ph.D., Edinburgh; LL.M., Columbia; J.D., Washburn; Ph.D., M.A., B.A., Kansas.
Executive Professor, Texas A&M School of Law and Department of History (joint
appointment). The author wishes to thank Megan Reed, his research assistant and a
student at Texas A&M School of Law, for her considerable contribution to the
authorities cited below. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone
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of an "enterprise").1 This is ideal land upon which to lay out a multitude of
interpretive tracks, which, as Karl Llewellyn once remarked, "lead in happily
variant directions."
2
II. INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH TO RICO
A. Some RICO Realism
I do not intend the reference to Llewellyn to signal that my aim is to
make a full- blown Realist critique of statutory interpretation within a set of
RICO cases. But a couple of that group's insights take us a fair way towards
understanding how and why certain decisions are made the way that they are.
First, RICO, with its difficult structure and "fuzzily" defined terms, is a
fitting exemplar of Jerome Frank's observation that "the popular notion of
the possibilities of legal exactness is based on a misconception. The law
always has been, is now, will ever continue to be, largely vague and
variable."3 Second, under analytical and interpretive pressure, decisions
reveal a process of "rationalization" at work: viz., written opinions do not
mirror the process giving rise to them but rather show only "trained lawyers'
arguments made by the judges (after the decision has been reached), intended
to make the decision seem plausible, legally decent, legally right, to make it
seem, indeed, legally inevitable[.]"4
' 18 U.S.C. § 1964. I've previously discussed RICO's structure, application and
history in greater detail than I will in this article. For a fuller analysis of matters
merely summarized or excerpted below, see my four other RICO articles: Randy D.
Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles: Can a Corporation be Part of an Association-in-
Fact RICO Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, and Rhetorical Perspectives, 16 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 973 (2014) [hereinafter Gordon, Gangs and Gaggles]; Randy D.
Gordon, Clarity and Confusion: RICO's Recent Trips to the United States Supreme
Court, 85 TUL. L. REV. 677 (2011) [hereinafter Gordon, Clarity and Confusion];
Randy D. Gordon, Crimes that Count Twice: A Reexamination of RICO's Nexus
Requirements under 18 U.S. C §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REV. 171 (2007)
[hereinafter Gordon, Crimes that Count Twice]; Randy D. Gordon, Rethinking Civil
RICO: The Vexing Problem of Causation in Fraud-Based Claims under 18 U.S. C.
§ 1962(c), 39 U.S.F.L. REV. 319 (2005) [hereinafter Gordon, Rethinking Civil
RICO].
2 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 373
(1960).
3 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6 (1930); Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2256-
60 (2003) (discussing how "[tihe courts have made it easy for federal prosecutors
to use the mail fraud statute to obtain federal jurisdiction over 'garden-variety
frauds,' but extremely difficult for plaintiffs to use the mail fraud statute to sue for
treble damages over those same 'garden-variety frauds"').
I Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1238-39 (1931).
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As Brian Leiter explains, "all the Realists endorsed what may be
called 'the Core Claim' of Realism: in deciding cases, judges respond
primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than to legal rules and
reasons."5 In reacting to the facts, "sociological" Realists (like Llewellyn)
thought "that various 'social' forces must operate upon judges to force them
to respond to facts in similar, and predictable ways."6 This does not mean
that statutory interpretation is purely an ad hoc facts-only exercise: "If a
statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose.
A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense."7
So, in one sense, our project here is to construct an account of how a court
goes about the task of discerning a statute's "purpose or objective," and how
"social forces" figure into the process.8
B. An Interpretive Toolkit for RICO
A judge facing an interpretive question has an array of tools at his or
her disposal. In recommending one approach over another, I've found-it
helpful first to sort the candidates into the categories that Neil MacCormick
has suggested:9 linguistic, systemic, and teleological-evaluative arguments
(all of which can be suffused with intentional arguments)."0 Linguistic
arguments often present appeal to "plain meaning" or "ordinary language."'"
Systemic arguments evaluate particular text-bites in a larger context, perhaps
in other sections of a statute, an entire statutory title, or other aspects of a
whole legal system. 2 Teleological-evaluative arguments focus on the
consequences of rival interpretations and try to match the preferred
interpretation with particular salutary social ends or values. 3 And, as one
might suspect, each of these techniques necessarily invokes (or claims to
demonstrate) the "intent" or "purpose" of the legislature in choosing
particular words, leaving out particular words, and so forth.'4
' Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 52 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson, eds., 2005).
6 Id at 54. By contract, Leiter identifies Frank as an "idiosyncratic" Realist, who
believed that "what determines the judge's response to the facts of a particular case are
idiosyncratic facts about the psychology or personality of that individual judge."
7 LLEEWLLYN, supra note 2, at 374.
8d; Leiter, supra note 5, at 54.
9 See Gordon, Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 1, at 997.
10 NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 124-25 (2005).
11 Id at 125.
12 Id at 127 32. MacCormick sub-categorizes systemic arguments in terms of(1)
contextual harmonization, (2) precedent, (3) analogy, (4) conceptual, (5) general
principles, and (6) history.
13 Id at 132-37.
14Id at 125.
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1. Linguistic Arguments
Because we can never be certain what a legislature meant, we are left
with what it said. This does not mean that judges are blinkered to
intentionalist appeals and at an interpretive remove from their own social
constructions: for as MacCormick suggests, even linguistic arguments and
justifications can be infused with intentionalist notes. So let's begin (we'll
elaborate later) with some baseline "intent" assumptions that everyone can
agree on. Congress's declared purpose in passing the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970-of which RICO is one part-was "to seek the
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."15
Together, the eleven titles of the Act form these "legal tools"; three of them,
Titles VIII (interstate gambling), IX (RICO), and XI (distribution of
explosives), created new substantive offenses. 6 The point to be taken here is
that Congress didn't just outlaw "organized crime" (in fact the phrase
remains undefined in the Act); rather, it sought to craft procedures and
remedies to correct "defects" in existing law that allowed organized criminals
to evade prosecution. RICO was intended to remedy (at least) one of these
defects.
There is no dispute that "the major purpose of Title IX is to address
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime."' 7 "Major," of
course, doesn't mean "only," so the big question remaining is, what are the
other purposes? 8 The Supreme Court's first significant step towards an
'1 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970).
16 Id. at §§ 803(a), 901(a), 1102(a).
'7 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
1 Justice Thomas's dissent in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. fairly represents a
major strain of concern, especially along RICO's civil dimension:
Judicial sentiment that civil RICO's evolution is undesirable is
widespread. Numerous justices have expressed dissatisfaction
with either the breadth of RICO's application, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court's
interpretation of the civil RICO statute quite simply
revolutionizes private litigation; it validates the federalization of
broad areas of state common law of frauds, and it approves the
displacement of well- established federal remedial
provisions .... [T]here is no indication that Congress even
considered, much less approved, the scheme that the Court today
defines"), or its general vagueness at outlining the conduct it is
intended to prohibit, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by
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answer came in Turkette. There the Supreme Court held with the majority of
the circuit courts and found that "neither the language nor structure of RICO
limits its application to legitimate 'enterprises.""' 9 This meant that RICO
would henceforth be interpreted not just as prohibiting the corruption of
legitimate organizations (like labor unions, waste management companies,
or Las Vegas casinos) but directly to the illegal acts of criminal
organizations." And although this holding doesn't control all the interpretive
questions that courts face, it alerts us to something approaching a truism of
RICO jurisprudence: the Supreme Court is loath to interpret RICO in a way
that limits its criminal reach. One can speculate as to why this might be, but
"the Court's unwillingness to reject an interpretation of the statute that
provides so many advantages to the government in its battle with organized
crime" seems as good an explanation as any.2 With these thoughts in mind,
we can now turn to some preliminary general linguistic observations.
Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in
judgment) ("No constitutional challenge to this law has been
raised in the present case .... That the highest Court in the land
has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than
today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that
challenge is presented").
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,547 U.S. 451, 471-72 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
'9 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587.
20 In practice, this has made it difficult to distinguish an association-in-fact
enterprise from a criminal conspiracy. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, -
945-47 (2009) (describing what is not required for an association-in-fact
enterprise).
21 DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO 3.02[1] (2017). Justice
Thomas highlights the other, civil, side of the conundrum in his Anza dissent when
he notes that, among other things, civil RICO suits almost never turn on conduct
that one would associate with Mafia-like behavior:
Congress plainly enacted RICO to address the problem of
organized crime, and not to remedy general state-law criminal
violations. See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U. S. 229, 245 (1989). There is some evidence, to be sure,
that the drafters knew that RICO would have the potential to
sweep more broadly than organized crime and did not find that
problematic. Id. at 246-248. Nevertheless, the Court has
recognized that "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving
into something quite different from the original conception of its
enactors." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500
(1985)
This case, like the majority of civil RICO cases, has no apparent
connection to organized crime. See Sedima, 473 U. S. at 499,
n. 16 (quoting an ABA Task Force determination that, over the
period reviewed, only 9% of civil RICO cases at the trial court
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
At the outset, we must note that a "plain meaning" analysis can take
us only so far.2 For as members of Congress complained at the time of its
consideration, RICO "embodies poor draftsmanship," a complaint echoed in
many court decisions. And even though Justices of the Supreme Court
repeatedly insist that particular sections of RICO are "clear" or "plain," they
vehemently disagree as to what that clear or plain meaning is.24 We will defer
for now the question of why that might be and simply register that courts
often take a "plain meaning" approach to RICO provisions that are anything
but plain. Nonetheless, the text is a convenient and necessary starting point.
What we find in the case law are appeals to dictionary definitions, syntactic
rules common to standard English, canons of construction, and the structure
of the statute itself, all of which often slide into evaluative arguments about
intent and purpose.
2. Systemic Arguments
RICO's many vagaries provide almost endless possibilities for
devising systemic interpretive arguments based on policy, principles, history
and the like. Here, in summary-list form, are ways with which to label some
of the techniques that we will see applied in the cases that we'll soon examine
in detail.
level involved "'allegations of criminal activity of a type
generally associated with professional criminals"'). Given the
distance the facts of this case lie from the prototypical organized
criminal activity that led to RICO's enactment, it is tempting to
fimd in the Act a limitation that will keep at least this and similar
cases out ofcourt.
Anza, 547 U.S. at 471-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22 For a full-blown analysis of the linguistic features of a particular RICO
provision, see Gordon, Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 1, at 998-1011 (discussing
"enterprise" element of RICO).
23 H.R. REP. 91-1549, at 185 (1970) (dissenting views of Representative John
Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William Ryan); see, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) ("RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but
rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this Court.").
24 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 494-97 (1985) (finding §
1964(c) clear, but divided on the plain meaning of the text). In Sedima, all
nine Justices agreed that § 1964(c) was unambiguous, but split 5-4 as to the
provision's plain meaning. See id (holding that the plain language of
§ 1964(c) forecloses an "amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement"); id. at
509-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's rejection of a
"racketeering injury" requirement "distorts the statutory language under the guise
of adopting a plain-meaning definition, and it does so without offering any
indication of congressional intent that justifies a deviation from.., the plain
meaning of the statute"); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES 101 (1993) (noting that "in an interesting voting paradox, the justices
agreed 9-0 that the language is plain, but disagreed 5-4 about what it means").
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a. Contextual Harmonization -
"The argument from contextual harmonization looks to the way in
which any statutory provision is to be found nested in a larger legal scheme,
at least that of the single whole statute, often that of a set of related
statutes."2 5 The aim of this technique is to find the proper interpretation of a
troublesome statutory provision by searching other statutory provisions that
cast light back on the target. Some observers have opined that the antitrust
laws and RICO serve some of the same ends: in particular, preserving a free
marketplace and honest competition. So courts sometimes consider RICO
claims in this light.
b. Precedential Argument
"The argument from precedent says that if a statutory provision has
previously been subjected to judicial interpretation, it ought to be interpreted
in conformity with the interpretation given to it by other courts."26 At this
point, RICO has a substantial jurisprudential history, including many
significant Supreme Court decisions.
c. Analogical Argument
Statutes do not exist in a vacuum, and so where one is faced with
interpreting a statute that is significantly analogous to another, it makes good
sense to interpret the one in harmony with the other.27 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act and Section 1964(c) of RICO contain nearly identical language.
Not surprisingly, then, courts often look to prior interpretations of the former
in considering the latter.
d. Conceptual Argument
A conceptual argument, which gains its validity by appealing to the
desire for coherence across a whole system, "says that if any recognized and
doctrinally elaborated general legal concept is used in the formulation of a
statutory provision, it ought to be interpreted so as to maintain a consistent
use of the concept throughout the system as a whole."28 In some cases, a
conceptual argument is a broader application of the theory behind contextual
harmonization arguments. In other words, one can range further afield from
a word or phrase as it is nestled in a statute or set of related statutes. Because
civil RICO can be thought of as a statutory tort, courts naturally refer to
25 MACCORMICK, supra note 9, at 128.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 129.
28Id. at 130.
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general tort concepts of causation when determining whether a particular
claim should stand or fall for reasons of causation.
e. General Principles Argument
General principles argue that, if there are general principles of law
relevant to the target statute, the statute should be interpreted in the way that
is most congruent with those principles. 29 An uncodified portion of RICO
directs that it "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."3 But there is a countervailing constitutional principle in play-
the rule of lenity, which "ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in
a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered., 31 As a canon
of construction, the rule finds voice in the notion that criminal statutes must
be strictly construed.3 2 Thus, if any portion of the statute were determined to
be ambiguous, the rule of lenity would demand a narrow reading of the terms
at issue: "RICO, since it has criminal applications as well, must, even in its
civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal
laws."33
f Historical Argument
"The argument from history takes note that a statute or group of
statutes can over time come to be interpreted in accordance with a historically
evolved understanding of the point and purpose of the statute, or of the group
of statutes taken together as a whole."34 One way to think about this type of
argument vis-&i-vis RICO is to consider the substantial precedent holding that
the statute applies or does not apply in recurring scenarios. Another way is
to think about the purpose of RICO and how well particular interpretations
of the statute fit with that purpose. We will take up these ideas more fully
later, but it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on cases in which the
Supreme Court made a policy decision to read RICO broadly so as to make
more criminals subject to RICO's proscriptions and penalties. But those
2 9 Id
30 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970).
31 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also G. Robert Blakey &
Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against
White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 546 n.74 (1987); Solan, supra
note 23, at 77-81 (discussing how the Supreme Court interpreted the term
"enterprise" in the context of RICO); Caroline N. Mitchell et al., Returning RICO
to Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute an Associated-in-Fact Enterprise
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, at 19-20
(discussing and defining the rule of lenity).
32 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.
33 H.J. inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
34 MACCORMICK, supra note 342, at 130.
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decisions came at an associated cost: subsequent courts and even civil
litigants must interpret the section in light of those holdings, which is to say
in light of history.35 These consequences demand closer examination, a
subject to which we now turn.
3. Teleological- Evaluative Arguments: Consequentialism by
Another Name
Examining the language and context of a statute are important tools
in interpretation, but as MacCormick reminds us, "other values can be
significant."3 6 Some of these values begin to emerge from the background
when we consider that statutes are not sui generis: they are the product of the
purposive acts of legislators. These acts are taken "with a view to reforming
the law"-to correcting what MacCormick calls a "mischief' in the existing
body of law.37Thus, an interpretation that would achieve the ends at which a
statute is aimed (be it curing a defect, closing a loophole, or reforming an
inequity) has much to commend it. One way of thinking about this is, as Lon
Fuller once suggested, by analogy to an invention that was left as a pencil
sketch at the time that its author died.38 Someone continuing that work would
have to ask what the projected device was supposed to do and discern its
motivating principles. According to Fuller:
[s]o it is usually with difficult problems of interpretation. If
the draftsman of a statute were called into direct
consultation, he would normally have to proceed in the same
3 Solan suggests that courts have interpreted RICO under a "law enforcement
model," meaning that courts "have been generous with prosecutors and stingy with
civil plaintiffs in interpreting various provisions of the statute." Solan, supra note
3, at 2255. This phenomenon was no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the
interpretations of RICO's substantive provisions first occurred in criminal cases,
where the courts were inclined to give the Government a fair amount of leeway in
its fight against crime. And, as Reed and Smith note:
[t]he happenstance that civil RICO was not "discovered" by the
plaintiff's bar until the 1980's has had an important influence on
the development of RICO jurisprudence. Had the much deplored
explosion of civil RICO litigation occurred ten years earlier, the
courts would have interpreted the statute much more restrictively
than they did with only criminal RICO prosecutions on their
docket.
SMITH & REED, supra note 20, at 3.02[1], n.19 (noting also that "[o]nly a handful
of civil RICO cases were brought between 1970 and 1980").
36 MACCORMICK, supra note 9, at 132.
S1d; see also John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1924-35 (2015) (discussing the realities of the legal process versus the
textualist interpretation).
38 LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84-88 (rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press
1969).
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manner as the judge by asking such questions as the
following: Does this case fall within the mischief which the
statute sought to remedy? Does it fall within the "true reason
of the remedy" appointed by the statute, that is, is the
prescribed remedy apt for dealing with this particular
manifestation of the general mischief at which the statute
was aimed?39
We now consider three sets of cases in which courts have deployed
the full arsenal of interpretive weapons in skirmishes set to determine RICO's
territorial boundaries. I'll start with a recent Supreme Court case deciding
questions concerning the extraterritorial application of RICO, proceed to
cases establishing standing and causation standards, and conclude with
unsettled questions relating to the availability of equitable relief.
II. RICO INTERPRETATION IN THREE SETS
A. Does RICO have borders?
In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide two questions involving the extraterritorial reach
of RICO.4" As the Court cast them: "First, do RICO's substantive
prohibitions, contained in § 1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign
countries? Second, does RICO's private right of action, contained in §
1964(c), apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries."' Both these
questions can be cast as problems of interpretation.
The case arrived at the Supreme Court against a complicated
procedural and factual backdrop. In terms of procedure, the European
Community (the EC) and six of its member states first sued R.JR and several
related entities for RICO violations in 2000.
The litigation spawned at least three separate actions and multiple
oscillations between federal district and appellate courts.4 2 Of immediate
concern was the district court's dismissal of the case, followed by the
Second Circuit's reinstatement.43
39 Id. at 85.
40 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2016).
41 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098.
42 See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771, 2011 WL 843957,
at * 1-2 (E.D.N.Y. March 8, 2011) (cataloguing the case's procedural twists and
turns).
43 Compare id. at *1 (dismissing RICO claims), and European Cmty. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing state-law
claims), with European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.
2014) (reversing the district court's dismissal of all claims).
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Reduced to the essentials, the EC alleged that RJR and organized
criminal organizations participated in a global money-laundering scheme. In
one thread of the scheme, Colombian and Russian drug traffickers smuggled
narcotics into the EC, sold the drugs for euros, and then used these proceeds
to purchase large blocks of RJR cigarettes that were sold into the EC.44 In
another thread of the alleged scheme, RJR conspired with South American
drug traffickers and money launderers and-in violation of international
sanctions-sold cigarettes to Iraq.45 The EC also alleged that RJR's
acquisition of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation was ostensibly for
the purpose of expanding the pattern of illegality.
46
Cast in RICO's statutory terms, the EC alleged that RJR engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activity rooted in predicate acts ranging from money
laundering to support of foreign terrorist organizations, mail and wire fraud,
and Travel Act violations. 47 RJR and its cohorts allegedly formed an
association-in-fact enterprise dubbed the "RJR Money-Laundering
Enterprise., 48 Once assembled, these factual bits constitute an averment that
RJR violated all four of RICO's criminal prohibitions: (1) using income
derived from the pattern of racketeering to invest in, acquire an interest in,
and operate the RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise in violation of § 1962(a);
(2) acquiring and maintaining control of the enterprise through the pattern of
racketeering in violation of § 1962(b); (3) operating the enterprise through the
pattern of racketeering in violation of § 1 9 62(c); and (4) conspiring with other
schemers in violation of § 1962(d). 49 These violations allegedly caused the
EC harm, "including ... competitive harm to their state- owned cigarette
businesses, lost tax revenue from black-market cigarette sales, harm to
European financial institutions, currency instability, and increased law
enforcement costs.
50
With respect to the first question, the Court began from the "basic
premise of our legal system that, in general, 'United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world."' 51 This pronouncement is rooted
in a "presumption against extraterritoriality" that finds expression in a canon
of statutory construction and broad policy-based holdings: "Absent clearly
expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed
44 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098.
45 Id
46 Id
47 
_d
48 Id
49 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098.
50 Id
51 Id. at 2100 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
to have only domestic application. 52 So, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."5 3
With this conceptual policy lens in hand, the Court moved to a more
particular examination of recent precedent, first looking at a case under §
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and then at one under the Alien Tort
Statute.54 From these two cases, which it found analogous, the Court divined
an underlying "two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues."55
The first step is relatively straightforward: does the statute give an
unequivocal, affirmative indication that it has an extraterritorial reach?56 The
second step requires a more nuanced, fact-based inquiry, not just a facial
statutory examination. To wit, if the statute is not by its express terms
extraterritorial, then a court must determine whether the case at hand has a
domestic component that pushes it into the statute's "focus."57 To make this
determination a court must winnow jurisdictionally significant facts from
those that are not:
If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the
United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic
application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the
conduct relevantto the focus occurred in a foreign country,
then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial
application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in
U. S. territory."5 8
This second step is irrelevant, however, if the statute clearly does
have extraterritorial reach. In that case, the inquiry becomes largely textual:
"The scope of an extraterritorial statute thus turns on the limits Congress has
(or has not) imposed on the statute's foreign application, and not on the
statute's 'focus."' 5 9
So the first question facing the Court-at least at a superficial level-
was whether the substantive provisions of § 1962 apply extraterritorially.
Certainly, there is no text in § 1962 itself that one can point to as an
unequivocal statement of extraterritorial application. But that's not the end
of the inquiry because-to recall RICO's three-part structure-§ 1962's
prohibitions are triggered by the existence of a pattern of racketeering
52 d. (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
11 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
14 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100-01 (discussing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247, and
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)).55 Id. at 2101.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
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activity, which is defined to include violations of numerous statutory
predicates. The Court thus pivoted to an examination of these other statutes
and easily found that many of them do expressly apply with extraterritorial
force.6" For example:
* 18 U. S. C. §1957(d)(2) prohibits transactions in
criminally derived property, including when "the
defendant is a United States person" and even if the
offenses "tak[e] place outside the United States.'
* § 3 51 (i) prohibits the assassination of Government
officials and "[tihere is extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the conduct prohibited by this section",;
62
0 § 1203(b) prohibits against hostage taking in a
range of circumstances even if the critical acts
"occurred outside the United States"; 63 and
* § 2332(a) prohibits "kill[ing] a national of the
United States, while such national is outside the
United States," a prohibition that can only to
conduct occurring outside the United States.'
From this, the Court concluded that "Congress's incorporation of
these (and other) extraterritorial predicates into RICO gives a clear,
affirmative indication that § 1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity. 65
But this does not mean that § 1962 always applies extraterritorially; rather, it
only has that scope to the extent "that the predicates alleged in a particular
case themselves apply extraterritorially." 66 In sum, "a pattern of racketeering
activity may include or consist of offenses committed abroad in violation of
a predicate statute for which the presumption against extraterritoriality has
been overcome.,
67
This holding comes with an important limitation, though. For
purposes of assessing extraterritorial liability under § 1962, only those
predicate acts with extraterritorial effect will "count." This is so for two
reasons. First, as a general matter the presumption against extraterritoriality
60 Id.
61 Id (internal quotations omitted).
62 Id (internal quotations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. §1751(k) (using the same
language as § 351 (i)).
63 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101-02 (internal quotations omitted).
6 Id at 2102 (internal quotations omitted).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id
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limits the scope of a statement of extraterritoriality to its terms.6" Second, and
more specifically, "RICO defines as racketeering activity only acts that are
'indictable' .. . . If a particular statute does not apply extraterritorially, then
conduct committed abroad is not 'indictable' under that statute and so cannot
qualify as a predicate under RICO's plain terms. 69
At the end of this analysis, we may safely conclude that RICO covers
some foreign racketeering activity-viz., "a pattern of racketeering that
includes predicate offenses committed abroad, provided that each of those
offenses violates a predicate statute that is itself extraterritorial."7 If properly
pled and proven, this fact will be outcome determinative of the
extraterritoriality question under § 1962(b) and § 1962(c) because both
prohibit the use of a pattern of racketeering in achieving certain ends.71
§ 1962(b) (barring use of pattern of racketeering activity both to acquire or
maintain control of an enterprise and to conduct the affairs of an enterprise).72
With respect to the latter, the Court left the matter open to later decision; with
respect to the former, the Court concluded that because § 1962(a) targets the
use of income derived from a pattern of racketeering rather than the use of
the pattern itself, § 1962(a) might well extend only to domestic uses of the
income.73 But because the issue made no difference in the case at hand, the
Court left that issue, too, undecided.74
To this point, the Court established only that a substantive, criminal
violation of RICO can, in proper circumstances, be predicated on foreign
conduct. But what about a civil claim? To answer that question, the Court
undertook an analysis of § 1964(c), which, to recall our earlier discussion,
permits "any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962" to sue for treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees. 75 At the outset of the analysis, the Court determined that it must
"separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO's cause
of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with
68 RIR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102.
6 9 Id.
70 Id at 2103.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2016) (barring use of pattern of racketeering activity both to
acquire or maintain control of an enterprise and to conduct the affairs of an
enterprise).
72 RIR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103.
73 Id.
74 Id. The Court went on to consider another technical RICO-specific issue: viz.,
whether a RICO claim must be predicated on the existence of a domestic
"enterprise." The Court held that it need not be, although "a RICO enterprise must
engage in, or affect in some significant way, commerce directly involving the
United States-e.g., commerce between the United States and a foreign country.
Enterprises whose activities lack that anchor to U. S. commerce cannot sustain a
RICO violation." Id. at 2105.
75 § 1964(c).
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respect to RICO's substantive prohibitions."76 The reason for this conclusion
resides in notions of international comity: "providing a private civil remedy
for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that
presented by merely applying U. S. substantive law to that foreign
conduct."77
As a specific example, the Court considered antitrust law, which it
had previously noted that private treble-damages actions generated
considerable controversy abroad, even when the affected foreign states
agreed with the U.S. on substantive points of law (e.g., price fixing should
be condemned).7 8 In an ironic twist, the Court noted that two of the claimants
(including Germany and France) had argued in other cases that "to apply [U.
S.] remedies would unjustifiably permit their citizens to bypass their own less
generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance of competing
considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody."79 In an
attempt to slip this knot, the claimant countries urged the Court to draw a
distinction between suits brought by foreign citizens and those brought by
foreign sovereigns.8" The court "refuse[d] to adopt this double standard."81
The Court then moved to a textual examination and-finding no
explicit reference to extraterritoriality-spent the remainder of its effort
knocking down appeals to precedent and arguments by analogy. First, the
Court considered the statement in Sedima that "compensable injury"
identified in § 1964(c) "necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts
sufficiently related to constitute a pattern."82 The EU argued that this
equivalence put an end to the matter; the Court said it begged the question
because "the presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied
separately to both RICO's substantive prohibitions and its private right of
action."" Second, the Court considered the EU's argument that a long history
supports the notion that American courts are open to plaintiffs injured abroad.
The Court found that this rule, too, begged the question because it does
nothing more than allow plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts and have foreign law
provide the rule of decision.
8 4
Finally, the Court considered the EU's argument that § 1964(c)
should be interpreted and applied in pari maleria to its direct ancestor, § 4 of
the Clayton Act. In other words, so the reasoning goes, because the Court had
76 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
7 7 Id.
78 Id.
7 9 Id at 2106-07.
80Id. at 2108
81 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108.
82 Id (internal quotations omitted).
83 Id.
84 1d at 2109.
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held that § 4 allows recovery for injuries suffered abroad, consistency
demands that § 1964(c) be read to provide the same private right of action.85
But the Court disagreed, finding that-although the Clayton Act could
sometimes offer "guidance in construing § 1964(c)"---it had "not treated the
two statutes as interchangeable. 86 As an example, the Court pointed to
Sedima, in which it rejected a "racketeering injury" pleading requirement that
some lower courts had adopted by "[a]nalog[y]" to the "antitrust injury"
requirement of the Clayton Act.8 7
The Court was also at some pains to distinguish Pfizer, in which the
Court held that the Clayton Act allows recovery for foreign injuries. In
particular, the Court noted that Pfizer turned on a finding that the Clayton
Act's definition of a "person" entitled to sue "explicitly includes
'corporations and associations existing under or authorized by... the laws
of any foreign country.""'88 Because RICO lacks this language, the analogy is
considerably weakened. And to the extent that Pfizer cited other factors that
could cast light on § 1964(c), "they were not sufficient in themselves to show
that the provision has extraterritorial effect."8 9 Finally, the Court rejected, as
an already discredited approach, the policy-based reasoning that a finding of
no extraterritoriality might allow a wrongdoer to escape "full liability for his
illegal actions."9
In a parting shot, the Court invoked the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 which-in the Court's reading-sharply reduced
the ability of private plaintiffs to sue for conduct that "causes only foreign
injury."'" The Court conceded that this enactment does not limit § 1964(c)'s
scope by its own force, but "it does counsel against importing into RICO
those Clayton Act principles that are at odds with our current
extraterritoriality doctrine."92
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg agreed that
"when the predicate crimes underlying invocation of § 1962 thrust
extraterritorially, so too does § 1962." ' But she sharply disagreed "that the
private right of action authorized by § 1964(c) requires a domestic injury to
a person's business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign
85 Id.
86 RJRNabisco, 136 S. Ct at 2109.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 Id at 2110.
90 Id.
91 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct at 2110 (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004)).92 1d. at 2110-11.
93 Id. at 2112 (Ginsberg, J. concurring).
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injuries."94 The reason is textual: "One cannot extract such a limitation from
the text of § 1964(c), which affords a right of action to '[a]ny person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962."'"9 Read
in this light, the question presented thus becomes, how can § 1964(c) exclude
claims that all agree are covered by § 1962 "when, by its express terms, §
1964(c) is triggered by 'a violation of section 1962'?,,96 To answer this
question, Justice Ginsberg pursued three lines of argument.
First, she appealed to precedent that linked-not separated-
"prohibited activities and authorized remedies." 97 Sedima, in particular, held
that "[i]f the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a
manner forbidden by [§ 1962], and the racketeering activities injure the
plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under §
1964(c). 98 Next, she noted that "the Court has long understood," that
"[i]ncorporating one statute.., into another... serves to bring into the latter
all that is fairly covered by the reference."99 Thus, because a § 1964(c) right
of action may be maintained by
[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962, . . . RICO's private right of
action, it cannot be gainsaid, expressly incorporates § 1962,
whose extraterritoriality, the Court recognizes, is
coextensive with the underlying predicate offenses
charged.'0 0
With respect to the majority's objections rooted in notions of
extrasystemic comity, Justice Ginsberg made two general points. First, -
Invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality as a bar
to any private suit for injuries to business or property abroad,
this case suggests, might spark, rather than quell,
international strife. Making such litigation available to
domestic but not foreign plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of
international comity or respectful of foreign interests.' 0'
Second, RICO's definitional provisions implicitly exclude
"[e]ntirely foreign activity" because a criminal act counts as a RICO
94 Id.
95 1d at2112 13.
96 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct at 2113.
97 Id.
98 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985).
99 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2113 (alterations in original) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Pan. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924)).
100 Id.
101 Id.
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predicate only when it is "chargeable under state law" or indictable under
specific federal statutes. 10 2 And, in any event, ample procedural mechanisms
are available to weed out cases with an insufficient nexus to the U.S.,
including the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the due process shackles
placed on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 103
Finally, Justice Ginsberg observed that her analysis comports with
both statutory history and broad notions of normative coherence: "As this
Court has repeatedly observed, Congress modeled § 1964(c) on § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15, the private civil-action provision of the federal
antitrust laws, which employs nearly identical language .... "04 And given
that the Court had repeatedly held that Clayton Act § 4 provides a remedy for
foreign injuries,0 5 "[t]he similarity of language in [the two statutes] is, of
course, a strong indication that [they] should be interpreted paripassu,"' 0 6 a
harmonizing course that the Court had pursued in other cases.10 7 Whether and
to what extent this "similarity of language" should control the flow of
interpretation remains an open question and is one to which we will now turn
with greater probity.
B. Who has standing under § 1964(c) of RICO and§ 4 of the Clayton
Act?
Although, as we've seen, the language of § 1964(c) of RICO is
derived from § 4 of the Clayton Act, each exists within a different interpretive
context. 0 8 By the same token, the shared language, which is open textured,
102 Id. at 1115 (quoting European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 783 F.3d 123, 143
(2d Cir. 2015) (Lynch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
103
Id.
104 1d. at 2113-14 (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189-190
(1997); Holmes v. Sec. lnv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U. S. 258, 267-68 (1992); Sedima,
473 U. S. at 485, 489)).
105 Id. at 2114 (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1978);
Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 707-08 (1962)).
'
06 Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Northcross v.
Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam)).
107 Id. (citing Klehr, 521 U. S. at 188-89; Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 155-156 (1987)).
10 I'll touch again on this subject later, but federal antitrust law has undergone
what we might think of as "purposive reassignment" in the hands of the courts.
Broadly stated, "Congress's objectives included not only the economic goal of low
prices and high quality brought about through competition, but also social and
political ends." David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 Mo.
L. REv. 725, 747 (2001). We see this view enshrined in the earliest cases, which
found all restraints-reasonable or not- illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-
Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). This view quickly eroded in favor of
condemning only "unreasonable" restraints, and by the time we get to the late the
1970s, the Supreme Court migrated to the view that antitrust claims must be
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presents interpretive challenges and opportunities for mischief. And since §
4 already had a long institutional interpretive history at the time of §
1964(c)'s adoption, additional questions arise as to whether the two sections
should be interpreted and applied in parallel (and, if so, how far down the
line).
The operative language of the two sections is deceptively simple:
"any person injured in his business or property by reason of" a substantive
antitrust or RICO violation may seek treble damages.'" 9 But this simplicity
"belies the complexity of the many questions it has raised."" 0 These
questions are, in many respects, merely a function of the breadth of the
language. For example, read literally, any person, no matter how remotely or
unforeseeably, injured by forbidden conduct can state a claim under either
statute. So courts have concluded that the right to civil recovery cannot be
that free ranging and have devised many ways to corral such claims."' It is
well beyond our present scope to trace the development and to examine the
finer points of these limiting doctrines, but a sketch of the major contours of
the doctrines will sufficiently illustrate our larger theoretical point. We'll
start with antitrust law, then move to consider how, why, and in what respects
RICO is treated differently.
In an integrated market economy like ours, an antitrust violation is
bound to have ripple effects that travel far beyond the immediate actors; some
decision must be made as to whether every injured person-no matter how
remotely-will be permitted to sue." 2 Courts have answered this question in
the negative, but their rationales for doing so are varied and-as we will
see-turn on notions of what evils the antitrust laws are designed redress.
grounded in "demonstrable economic effect." Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977).
109 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
10 HERBERT HOVENKEMP, FEDERL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.1, 804 (5th ed. 2011).
... Id ("By its language, § 4 appears to give a cause of action to every person who
is injured by a cartel or overcharging monopolist. The courts have concluded that
the statute cannot be as broad as it purports to be, however, and they have devised
ways to limit its scope."); see also, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
737-41 (1977) (holding that, in the context of illegal overcharging, only the
overcharged direct purchaser-and not others down the line--constitute a person
"injured in his business or property").
112 HOVENKEMP, supra note 108, at § 16.2, 806. The Clayton Act's provisions
essentially encourage litigation by people for whom the amount of recovery
discounted by the probability of success would otherwise be marginal. For
example, a common law breach of contract action providing single damages and no
attorney's fees might not be worth the risk; but if the action could be turned into an
antitrust violation, the outcome may look much more appealing. Plaintiffs are
continually tempted to turn every claimed business tort or contract breach into an
antitrust violation as well.
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The threshold limiting devices are packaged under the rubric of
"antitrust standing," which requires a court-in addition to finding
constitutional standing under Article 11-to answer three separate questions:
"[(1)] have plaintiffs alleged injury in fact; [(2)] have they alleged antitrust
injury[;] and [(3)] are they efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws?" '113
Because having no injury in fact at all would usually cause a failure of Article
III standing, the antitrust standing inquiry typically focuses on the latter two
questions.
As a judicial concept, "antitrust injury" traces to the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 14
That case arose after the defendant, a major manufacturer and distributor
(sometimes on credit) of bowling equipment and a significant operator of
bowling alleys, acquired several failing alleys that had (1) defaulted on their
repayment obligations, and (2) competed with the plaintiff.' Plaintiffs'
antitrust theory was that these alleys would have gone out of business but-for
defendant's acquisition of them, that the acquisition violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act, and that had the unlawfully acquired alleys gone out of
business, plaintiffs' business would have grown.1 6 So, in essence, the Court
was called upon to evaluate a claim of injury flowing from too much
competition. 17
This claim struck the Court as contradictory to the purpose of the
antitrust laws, which "were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors." 1' 8 The plaintiffs might have been injured, but "it was not 'by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws': while [their] loss occurred
'by reason of the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur 'by reason of that
which made the acquisitions unlawful." '119 This means that a plaintiffs cannot
recover merely upon a showing of an injury causally linked to a substantive
antitrust violation: "Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect
the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
I" In Re Zinc Antitrust Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 337, 357 (S.D.N.Y 2016); see also
Gatt Commc'ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2013)
("The right to pursue private actions for treble damages under § 4 has...
developed limiting contours over the thirty years since Associated General
Contractors was handed down. Those contours are embodied in the concept of
'antitrust standing."').
I" Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
115 Id. at 479-80.
116 Id. at 480-482.
117 Id. at 489 ("At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers
petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of
increased concentration.").
18 Id. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
119 Id
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made possible by the violation.' 2 ° What this represents is an ascription of
what the antitrust laws are supposed to do (and not do): "[T]he principal
objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging
firms to behave competitively.' ' 21 This determination of the objective of the
antitrust laws was not inevitable: one could easily imagine that the laws were
enacted to provide "justice, fairness, or the preservation of opportunities for
small businesses. 122
1. Who is an Efficient Enforcer?
The other difficult question bearing on antitrust standing is whether
a plaintiff is an "efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws.12 Courts have
articulated various formulations of the factors to consider in making an
efficient-enforcer determination, but the Second Circuit's list is fairly
representative: "(1) the 'directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,'
which requires evaluation of the 'chain of causation' linking [plaintiffs']
asserted injury and the [defendants'] alleged [antitrust violation]; (2) the
'existence of more direct victims of the alleged [violation]'; (3) the extent to
which [plaintiffs'] damages claim is 'highly speculative'; and (4) the
importance of avoiding 'either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one
hand, or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the other."",
124
"The efficient enforcer factors reflect a concern about whether the putative
plaintiff is a proper party to perform the office of a private attorney general
and thereby vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement.
1 25
120 Id at 489.
121 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (alteration
in original) (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 100 p. 4 (3d ed.
2006); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) ("Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.").
122 HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at § 16.2, 806; but see Cont'l T V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (ruling in favor of the manufacturer-rather
than the smaller retail store-in holding that the a court should apply the rule of
reason to vertical non-price restraints); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007) (acknowledging that "a basic antitrust
objective" is "providing consumers with a free choice about" "lower prices [rather
than] more service," but ruling in favor of the manufacturer-rather than the
smaller retail store-in holding that a court should apply the rule of reason to
vertical price restraints).
123 See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005)
("'A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient,' to establish
standing.") (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986)).
124 Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F. 3d 759, 778 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
540-45 (1983)).
125 Id. at 780 (internal quotations omitted).
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This last statement gets to the nub of the issue: courts have searched
for ways to permit private antitrust enforcement without proliferating an
unmanageable volume of cases. The "factors" and "tests" (like the one I just
recited) are designed to pare back the number of potential plaintiffs. From
this exercise, we can discern a set of institutional preferences. First, direct
injuries-as in all tort law-are preferred over "indirect" injuries. Second,
plaintiffs must fall within the class of a statute's targeted beneficiaries as
determined through ordinary statutory interpretation-direct customers and
competitors of the violator are typically favored.126 Running in the other
direction, we find a set of dislikes-indirect purchasers, nonpurchasers,
employees, shareholders, creditors, and more.
Taken in tandem, the antitrust-injury and efficient-enforcer rules
sharply reduce the number of cognizable private antitrust claims across two
dimensions. Antitrust injury cuts out plaintiffs with injuries found to be
outside the purview of the antitrust laws; efficient enforcer cuts out plaintiffs
with injuries that need not be addressed via private- party litigation.127 Now
why antitrust jurisprudence evolved in this way is well beyond our present
scope, but it's worth noting that over time courts migrated from condemning
conduct that seemed unfair and harmed small businesses to condemning only
conduct that causes demonstrable deleterious effects.12
2. Problems of Causation for RICO Standing
As a very broadly stated proposition, courts look to antitrust
precedent when formulating approaches to RICO standing.129 But this comes
126 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-41 (holding that, in the context of
illegal overcharging, only the overcharged direct purchaser-and not others down
the line-constitute a person "injured in his business or property").
127 HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at § 16.3(b), 812 ("The purpose of the antitrust
injury requirement... [is to ensure] that the harm claimed by the plaintiff
corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first
place.").
128 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding that the
rule of reason, rather than a per se rule, should be applied to the defendant's
vertical territorial restraints in its franchise agreements); see also Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007) (holding that
"[v]ertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason" rather
than by a per se rule, thereby overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)); see also Shores, supra note 106, at 728 ("[R]ecent
decisions leave no doubt that the Court has revised its view concerning the purpose
or goals of the antitrust laws.").
129 Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F. 3d 556 (6th Cir. 2013)
("With respect to § 1964(c), [its] limits have often been derived from the
similarities between RICO and the antitrust laws ... Courts have therefore looked
to § 4 of the Clayton Act; its predecessor, § 7 of the Sherman Act; and cases
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with a significant caveat- the Supreme Court fairly quickly squelched the
efforts of lower courts to develop-by- analogy notions of "racketeering
injury" and "competitive injury."13 In Sedima, the Court found nothing in
the statute suggesting that relief would be available only for a "racketeering
injury," a concept that the Court found vague and "unhelpfully
tautological." '13 1 But with respect to the efficient enforcer doctrine, with its
emphasis on directness of injury and proximate causation,'3 2 courts have
hewed much closer to the antitrust precedents. 33 For example, under the
Ninth Circuit rubric, courts should consider:
(1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged
wrongful conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the
law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be
difficult to ascertain the amount of the plaintiff's damages
construing these statutes in order to identify limits to the civil remedy afforded by §
1964(c)."). I.
130 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) ("In
borrowing its 'racketeering injury' requirement from antitrust standing principles,
the court below created exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid."); see also
Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2016) ("[T]he Supreme
Court rejected the Second Circuit's attempt to read RICO to impose liability only
against defendants who had been criminally convicted, and only for what the court
called 'racketeering injury."'). The Sedima Court also rejected a reading of 1964(c)
under which a claim could only be predicated on a prior conviction. Sedima, 473
U.S. at 488 ("[A] prior conviction-requirement cannot be found in the definition of
'racketeering activity.' Nor can it be found in § 1962, which sets out the statute's-
substantive provisions.").
131 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 494.
132 As a matter of diction, there is some surface confusion in the case law as to
whether the issue should be labeled as part of a "standing" or "proximate
causation" inquiry. The Sixth Circuit explains: "the two concepts overlap and that
is particularly true in the context of civil RICO claims. As a general matter, they
overlap because a plaintiff who lacks standing to vindicate a derivative injury also
will be unable to show proximate cause." Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d
602, 613 (6th Cir. 2004). For our purposes, this labeling makes no difference
because we're interested in the function of limiting doctrines, not what they're
called. In practice, though, categorization can make a significant litigation
difference, given that standing is a threshold Rule 12 issue and causation can often
be deferred to Rule 56 practice (or even trial). See id at 615 ("From a procedural
standpoint, a RICO case with a derivative-injury problem is better suited to
dismissal on the pleadings than a RICO case with a traditional proximate-cause
problem (e.g., a weak or insubstantial causal link, a lack of foreseeability, or a
speculative or illogical theory of damages.)").
13 See Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U. S. 258, 279 (1992) ("Today, the
Court sensibly holds that the statutory words 'by reason of operate, as they do in
the antitrust laws, to confine RICO's civil remedies to those whom the defendant
has truly injured in some meaningful sense."); see also Hemi Group, LLC v. City
of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
Cali. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541 n.46 (2010)).
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attributable to defendant's wrongful conduct; and (3)
whether the courts will have to adopt complicated rules
apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries.' 34
The Supreme Court tends to frame these inquiries in terms of
causation, and in this respect, there's a clear line connecting the antitrust and
RICO approaches. For example, in a seminal causation case, Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 13 the Court was called upon to decide
whether a plaintiff has standing to sue for a RICO violation that proximately
injures a third party and also derivatively injures the plaintiff. 36 This
presented a familiar and analogous question of tort-law causation: is but-for
causation sufficient to confer standing under § 1964(c)?137
The matter could not be resolved at a textual level because the
"language can ... be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of a
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's
violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff s injury."' 38 The Court rejected this
reading for reasons of analogy and precedent. Section 1964(c) is modeled on
§ 4 of the Clayton Act,139 which had been held to "incorporate common-law
131 Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
135 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 (1992).
136 See id. at 265 n.7. The petition phrased the question as follows:
Whether a party which was neither a purchaser nor a seller of
securities, and for that reason lacked standing to sue under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
1Ob-5 there under, is free of that limitation on standing when
presenting essentially the same claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
Id. (citation omitted).
137 See id at 266-67, 266 n.12.
138 Id. at 265-266.
139 Id. ("This construction is hardly compelled, however, and the very unlikelihood
that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us
that RICO should not get such an expansive reading."); see also Clayton Act of
1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982)). See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267, which states:
We have repeatedly observed that Congress modeled § 1964(c)
on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws [and] §
4 of the Clayton Act, which reads in relevant part that 'any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor...
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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principles of proximate causation."' 4 ° The Court saw no reason that this
holding should not extend to § 1964(c):
We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted
RICO, with knowing the interpretation federal courts had
given the words earlier Congresses had used first in § 7 of
the Sherman Act and later in the Clayton Act's § 4. It used
the same words, and we can only assume it intended them to
have the same meaning that courts had already given
them.'
4 1
As a matter of systemic coherence, then, "[p]roximate cause is thus
required.' 42
The Court could not, of course, articulate a one-size-fits-all test for
determining proximate cause, so open questions remained (and still
remain). 43 But there could be no doubt that Clayton Act precedent would
thereafter be a relevant point of departure. The Court recently reconfirmed
this in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., where it specifically invoked
Holmes's reliance on § 4:
Proper interpretation of § 1964(c) required consideration of
the statutory history, which revealed that "Congress
modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the
federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act." In Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519
(1983), the Court held that "a plaintiff's right to sue under §
4 required a showing that the defendant's violation not only
was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate
140 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267-68 (stating that Congress's use of § 7 language in
§ 4 has been interpreted by the Court to indicate the same congressional intent, and
therefore the Court has previously held that § 4 required a showing of proximate
causation).
141 Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
142 Id
143 Id (referring the lower courts to "the judicial tools used to limit a person's
responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts"). The Court also
observed that "[a]t bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what
justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient."' Id.
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROOSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)). The court went on to say, "accordingly, among the many
shapes this concept took at common law, was a demand for some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." Id. (citations
omitted).
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cause as well." This reasoning, the Court noted in Holmes,
"applies just as readily to § 1964(c)." '144
But we must remember that this analogy and related statutory history
is just a starting point. So although it is a commonplace of statutory
construction that statutory language should be interpreted according to plain
meaning and that like statutory language should be interpreted paripassu,145
that doesn't always happen. What we sometimes find is that language
borrowed from one statute is interpreted and applied quite differently in the
context of another. To paraphrase Jacques Lacan, language can be used to
say one thing through saying another. 46 So even though § 4 of the Clayton
Act and § 1964 of the RICO Act share common linguistic material.147
Disagreement nonetheless abounds as to the interpretation of each statute in
the context of making the determination of who is entitled to sue for
144 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006). For a fuller
discussion of this case, see Randy D. Gordon and Samuel E. Joyner, Annual RICO
Update, 29 TEX. Bus. LITIG. J. 24 (2006) and Gordon, Crimes that Count Twice,
supra note 1.
141 In the context of determining the meaning of a statute, "construction" and
"interpretation" are disputed terms. One of the main debates is whether judges
should consider the legislature's intent. See Cheryl Bodreau et al., Statutory
Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 2131, 2131
(2005) ("[Legal] scholars have pondered whether individuals and collectivities can
have intentions; they have asked whether it is possible for judges to discover the
legislature's actual intent; and they have questioned whether legislative intent
should play a role in judges' interpretations of statutes."). Another huge debate is
whether judges should consider a statute's legislative history. See Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND.
L. REv. 1457, 1458 (2000) ("In the long-running debate over methods of statutory
interpretation, no issue receives more attention than legislative history."). Here, for
simplicity's sake, I treat the terms synonymously.
14 6 See JACWUEs LACAN, FUNCTION AND FIELD OF SPEECH AND LANGAUGE (1953).
147 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150
(1987) ("Even a cursory comparison of the two statutes reveals that the civil action
provision of RICO was patterned after the Clayton Act."). Specifically, Section 4
of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Section 1964(c), RICO's civil enforcement provision provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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particular types of violations and what they're entitled to sue for. 48 Why
might this be?
As I've noted before, the government enforcement and private
litigation aims under RICO overlap less than, for instance, they do under the
federal antitrust laws, where criminal and civil litigation are both targeting
conduct that interferes with open competition. The difference represents
something of a division of labor: nowadays, federal enforcement aims its
resources at "hard core" violations like price fixing whereas private litigation
aims at fields that the government has largely abandoned like tying, boycotts,
price discrimination, and exclusive dealing, all of which are easily
recognizable as potential antitrust violations. RICO, in contrast, shows two
very different faces. Government prosecutions look very much like what one
would expect from an anti-Mafia criminal statute: typical indictments target
violent crime rings engaged in narcotics distribution, union infiltration,
gambling, and so forth.1 49 Private RICO litigation, by contrast, almost never
involves stereotypical gangland activity; typical complaints almost always
turn on allegations of fraud in business or consumer transactions.
1 50
At this point one might ask why antitrust litigation is contained and
RICO litigation is not. The superficial, question-begging answer is that-
although RICO's private-right-of-action provision is modeled on § 4 of the
148 See e.g, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985)
(refusing to require a "racketeering injury" under RICO even though an "antitrust
injury" is required for an antitrust violation).
141 Compare e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 940 (2d Cir. 1991)
(involving indictments with 24-counts that included, among other things, "murder,
conspiracy to murder, heroin trafficking, and conspiracy to distribute heroin") and
United States v. Dote, 150 F. Supp. 2d 935, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (involving an
indictment that "allege[d] a sequence of gambling offenses") with Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 484 (involving counts of mail and wire fraud).
150 See Gordon, Rethinking Civil Rico, supra note 1, at 323 n.20
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1031
(W.D. Ark. 2000). ("'[A] high percentage of civil RICO cases,
unlike typical antitrust cases, involve fraud claims."' (quoting
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191(1997)). As of
1985, "of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level,
40% involved securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a
commercial or business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of
criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional
criminals."' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16 (quoting ABA
SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, & BUS. LAW, REPORT OF
THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55-56 (1985)).
Additionally, "[r]oughly two fifths [sic] of all civil actions under
RICO are based on charges that the defendant committed mail or
wire fraud." Horace D. Nalle, Jr., Civil RICO Claims Predicated
on Mail or Wire Fraud: The Indispensability of Reliance, 109
BANKING L.J. 272, 272 (1992).
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Clayton Act-courts sometimes read the two provisions quite differently. As
we saw in Brunswick, the Court burdened private plaintiffs with a novel proof
requirement, "antitrust injury," that weakened one track of the parallel
government/private attorney general paradigm. 5' Again, lower courts once
similarly glossed § 1964(c) and required proof of "racketeering injury," 152 a
constraint that Sedima removed.'53 But as we saw in RJR Nabisco, the Court
also- depending on factual context-has found ways to read § 1964(c) more
restrictively than § 4. Is there a single key that explains these interpretive
inconsistencies? Perhaps not. But as I'll ultimately suggest, a court's sense
of RICO's purpose will guide its interpretation and application of the statute.
C. RICO and the Availability of Equitable Relief
1. Wollersheim and the Question of First Impression
Case law discussions of whether injunctions and other forms of
equitable relief" 4 are (or should be) available under RICO generally start
151 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
152 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494-503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985). ("[Sjtanding to sue under RICO [is not] limited only to
people who have standing to sue for a competitive injury under the antitrust
laws.... For purposes of clarity, it is better to identify the RICO standing
requirement as a 'racketeering injury' requirement rather than a 'competitive
injury' requirement...").
"' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 ("There is no room in the statutory language for an
additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement.").
' An interesting, though rarely discussed, issue is whether declaratory relief is
available in a RICO case. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, states
that "[in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court... may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party .... " One might
think that this statute would provide a basis for seeking declaratory relief
independent of what's provided in the RICO statute itself, but the few cases
addressing the issue do not bear that out. Instead, the cases treat a declaration as-if
it were an injunction and either allow or deny declaratory relief for the same
reasons that an injunction would be allowed or denied. See Am. Med. Ass 'n v.
United Healthcare Corp., 588 F. Supp. 2d 432, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Based upon
the weight of Second Circuit authority and Congress's failure to address the issue
within the statutory language itself, this Court will not infer that the right to
injunctive and declaratory relief exists for private litigants under Section 1964 of
RICO."); Aarona v. Unity House Inc., No. 05-00197, 2007 WL 1963701, at *16-
17 (D. Haw. July 2, 2007) (finding that declaratory relief is not available to a
private party after acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit has prohibited injunctive
relief but has not addressed declaratory relief); Johnson v. Collins Entm 't Co., Inc.,
199 F.3d 710, 726 (4th Cir. 1999) ("There is substantial doubt whether RICO
grants private parties.., a cause of action for equitable relief. This doubt is
especially acute in light of the fact that Congress has declined to authorize
injunctive remedies for private parties." (internal citations and quotations omitted));
Galaxy Distrib., Inc. v. Standard Distrib., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-04273, 2015 WL
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with an examination of Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim.155 In
that case, the court held that RICO does not afford injunctive relief to private
plaintiffs. 5 6 To reach this conclusion, the court pursed four lines of
argument: namely, linguistic/structural, historical, analogical, and doctrinal.
Each of these bears some analysis.
All the arguments run against a common backdrop: § 1964(a) is a
broad grant of equitable jurisdiction to federal courts; § 1964(b) allows the
government to seek equitable remedies; and § 1964(c) allows private
plaintiffs to recover treble damages, costs, and fees.157 Plainly, then, "[i]n
contrast to part (b), there is no express authority to private plaintiffs to seek
the equitable relief available under part (a)." '158 But the court quickly
conceded the truth of the aphorism that even a flat pancake has two sides:
"Admittedly, part (c) also does not expressly limit plaintiffs 'only' two
enumerated remedies, nor does part (a) expressly limit the availability of the
illustrative equitable remedies to the government." '5 9 With no clear path
forward, the court turned to an evaluation of the arguments that the plaintiff
urged.
With respect to linguistic/structural arguments, the court looked at
two alternatives. The first was a straight-up grammatical/word choice appeal:
"the [plaintiff] suggests that it is significant that the treble damage clause of
section 1964(c) is preceded by 'and' rather than 'to,"' which means that all
4366158, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. July 16, 2015) ("RICO does not provide for [the
plaintiff's] requested relief of declaratory judgment and permanent/preliminary
injunctions"); In re Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1282-83 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (finding the reasoning in Nat'l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267
F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001) persuasive to authorize both injunctive and declaratory
relief); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. 111. 1984)
(finding that "there is nothing in the language, structure or legislative history of
private civil RICO to suggest Section 1964(c) was meant to grant private plaintiffs"
declaratory and injunctive relief).
The same may be said of other remedies of an equitable or quasi-equitable
nature. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22-24 (1983) (concluding that some
things are forfeitable under some RICO subsections that are not forfeitable under
others); United States v. Philips Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (finding that RICO does not explicitly include disgorgement and therefore it
is not available to the Government); United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the availability of disgorgement is limited to the cases
where there is a finding "that the gains are being used to fund or promote the illegal
conduct, or constitute capital available for that purpose").
155 Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
156 Id. at 1088 ("Taken together, the legislative history and statutory language
suggest overwhelmingly that no private equitable action should be implied under
civil RICO.").
157 Id at 1082; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b)-(c) (2016).
158 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1082.
1 59 1d. at 1082-83.
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the equitable remedies of part (a) are imported into the private-party recovery
basket. 6 ° This reading apparently originated with Professor Blakey, who
elaborated on it thusly:
The plain language of subsection (c) reads that a person
injured "may sue ... and shall recover." The language does
not read "may sue . . . to recover." Because the usual
assumption is that legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words, and the word "and" means
"in addition to" or "along with," and the "and" proceeding
"shall recover" indicates that the language following is not
to be read restrictively, as it would if "to" proceeded "may
sue." Accordingly, all necessary and appropriate relief ought
to be held to be included in subsection (c). Recove ' of treble
damages, costs, and attorney fees that follow the "and" are
explicitly added to the right to sue for all usual forms of
relief. Indeed, nothing in subsection (c) says that they are the
only relief that a person may recover.' 61
This reading is not wholly implausible but it is relatively small beer
and, in fairness to the court, others had found the argument "rather
remarkable" and--even more pointedly- "bizarre and wholly unconvincing
as a matter of plain English and the normal use of language."'16
More convincingly, the plaintiff pointed to variations in language
between parts (a) and (b), specifically highlighting that part (a) is general in
scope with no apparent restrictions as to who may invoke the enumerated
remedies, whereas part (b) allows the Attorney General to seek temporary
equitable relief and to do so in derogation of traditional equity principles like
the need to show irreparable harm, inadequacy of legal remedies, or victim-
only standing.'63 So read, "part (a) [is] sufficient for a federal court to grant
and injunction to a private RICO plaintiff even if Part (c) had never been
added to section 1964.'' The court agreed that this interpretation "is
certainly a plausible reading of the statutory language."' 65 But the court
didn't end there: "our review of Congress' intent in enacting civil RICO
convinces us that the [plaintiff] is incorrect. The legislative history mandates
us to hold that injunctive relief is not available to a private party in a civil
RICO action."' 66
160 Id. at 1083.
161 Blakey, supra note 29, at 545-46.
162 Kaushal v. State Bank, 556 F. Supp. 576, 582 (N.D. 111. 1983).
163 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1083.
164 Id. at 1083-84.
165 Id. at 1084.
166 Id.
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Although RICO commentary is threaded with disagreements over
the statute's scope and purpose, one thing everyone can agree on is that its
legislative history is long, complicated, and-in many respects-
contradictory. On the issue of injunctions, the Wollersheim court began by
piecing together RICO's legislative lineage.16 7 Working backwards in time,
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, of which RICO is Title IX, was
derived from S. 30.168 The Senate added this Title to S. 30. Nonetheless, the
substance of Title IX appears in an earlier Senate bill, S. 1861 .169 Neither of
these predecessor bills contained a private civil cause of action, although an
even earlier predecessor, S. 1623, did contain a private cause of action closely
tracking the Clayton Act and, accordingly, provided explicitly for treble
damages and injunctive relief.70 But that was not the end of the trail because
that bill was patterned on two Senate bills from an earlier Congress, S. 2048
and S. 2049, both of which provided for private actions similar to those
provided in S. 1623.171 As the Wollersheim court read this bill shuffling, "the
Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary replaced S. 1623 with S. 1861 apparently in part
because S. 1861 provided broader governmental civil relief, such as the
investigative demand, and was in other ways a more comprehensive bill.' 7 2
The Wollersheim court also looked at parallel actions in the House,
especially H.R. 19215, which included a robust civil-claim provision that
explicitly provided for private-party injunctions.173 Even more important
than the House bills, though, was that § 1964(c) originated in the House as
an amendment to S. 30.' The House Judiciary hearings on S. 30 reveal the
deep connection between § 1964(c) and § 4 of the Clayton Act. In those
16 71 d at 1084-88.
168 Wollersheim, at 1084 (citing S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769
(1969)); see also G. Robert Blakey, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1017 (1980) ("In 1969, Senator John L. McClellan, in response to his longstanding
interest in organized crime, introduced Senate bill 30, which was based on a
number of the recommendations of the President's Crime Commission.").
169 Id. (citing S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9, 568-71 (1969); see
also 116 CONG. REC.
591 (remarks of Sen. McClellan)).
170 Id (citing S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6, 995-96 (1969); S.
1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(c), 4(a) (1969)).
171 Id. (citing 90th Cong., I st Sess. (1967); Belgard, Private Civil RICO Plaintiffs
Are Entitled to Equitable Relief under § 1964(a), 2 RICO L. REP. 537, 538
(quoting relevant provisions of these bills)).
172 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1083 (citing Hearings on Measures Relating to
Organized Crime Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 387-88, 407-08
(1969)).
173 Id.
174 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1985).
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hearings, Representative Steiger proposed the addition of a treble-damages
provision "similar to the private damage remedy found in the antitrust laws.
... [T]hose who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be
given access to a legal remedy. In addition, the availability of such a remedy
would enhance the effectiveness of title IX's prohibitions." '175 The American
Bar Association made a similar Clayton Act- rooted proposal.'76
Representative Steiger's proposal, as did the passed-over Senate bills
noted above, provided a private injunctive remedy under § 1964(a).177 But
the statutory language that was ultimately enacted came from H.R. 19586,
not H.R. 19215.' T As the Wollersheim court conceded, though, the
legislative history is silent as to why the subcommittee adopted one
formulation over the other. 7 9 Nonetheless, where some might see a mere
lacuna in the legislative record, the Wollersheim court read an "explicit[]
reject[ion of] a private injunctive relief provision." '1 80
As to the specific issue of whether § 1964(c) merely adds another
remedy to those made available to all plaintiffs (private or governmental) via
§ 1964(a), the court admitted that "[t]he legislative history offers some
support for this thesis. '181 This is especially so because-in introducing the
bill for House debate-the House sponsor, Representative Poff, stated:
Courts are given broad powers under the title to proceed
civilly, using essentially their equitable powers, to reform
corrupted organizations, for example, by prohibiting the
racketeers to participate any longer in the enterprise, by
ordering divestitures, and even by ordering dissolution or
reorganization of the enterprise. In addition, at the
suggestion of the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Steiger) and
also the American Bar Association and others, the
committee has provided that private persons injured by
reason of a violation of the title may recover treble damages
in Federal courts-another example of the antitrust remedy
being adapted for use against organized criminality.'82
175 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1084 (quoting Organized Crime Control: Hearings on
S. 30, and related proposals, before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings].
176 Id. (quoting House Hearings, supra note 176, at 543-44, 548, 559).
177 Id. (citing House Hearings, supra note 176, at 521 (subsection (c) of proposal of
Rep. Steiger)).
178 Id. at 1085.
171 Id. at 1084 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 25, 190 (remarks of Sen. McClellan
welcoming House addition of private treble damages remedy)).
180 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1085.
181 Id
182Id (emphasis in original) (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 35, 295 (1970)).
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Earlier Senate floor debates also drew attention to the value of private
equitable relief, as the remarks of Senator McClellan, the bill's principal
Senate sponsor, suggest:
Since enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the
courts have used several equitable remedies.., to implement
the language of 15 U.S.C. sections I and 2. 1 believe, and
numerous others have expressed a similar belief, that these
equitable devices can prove effective in cleaning up
organizations corrupted by the forces of organized crime.
83
This wasn't enough to tip the court in favor of equitable relief,
though, because "two separate episodes from the history of civil RICO's
legislative passage convince us that the conclusions the [plaintiff] would
have us draw from these congressional statements do not reflect Congress'
intent in section 1964."' As the court described these two episodes, in the
first "the House rejected an amendment, described as 'an additional civil
remedy,' which would expressly permit private parties to sue for injunctive
relief under section 1964(a)," and in the second, "in the very next year after
RICO's enactment, Congress refused to enact a bill to amend section 1964
and give private plaintiffs injunctive relief."'8 5 Even a quick review of the
circumstances surrounding these episodes shows that-although they tell in
the direction the court suggests-they are both far from definitive evidence
of Congressional intent.
During the House floor debates, Representative Steiger offered an
amendment that, in addition to other items, would have allowed private
injunctive relief.'86 But the proposal met with a strong procedural objection
from the bill's House sponsor, Representative Poff:
Mr. Chairman, I want to pay special tribute to the gentleman
in the well for having raised the issue which his amendment
defines. It does offer an additional civil remedy which I think
properly might be suited to the special mechanism fashioned
in title IX. Indeed, I am an author of an almost identical
amendment. It has its counterpart almost in haec verba in the
antitrust statutes, and yet I suggest to the gentleman that
prudence would dictate that the Judiciary Committee very
carefully explore the potential consequences that this new
remedy might have in all the ramifications which this
legislation contains and for that reason, I would hope that the
gentleman might agree to ask unanimous consent to
183 Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 35, 592 (1970)).
184 I.
185 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1085.
186 1d. (citing 116 CoNG. REc. 35, 227-28, 346 (1970)).
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withdraw his amendment from consideration with the
understanding that it might properly be considered by the
Judiciary Committee when the Congress reconvenes
following the elections or some other appropriate time.
187
In response to these remarks, Representative Steiger withdrew his
proposal1 88 and, consequently, the House passed the bill with the treble
damages provision in the form that the Committee recommended. 189 The
Senate subsequently adopted this version of the bill. 9°
The second incident that the Ninth Circuit found noteworthy is
related to the first. That is, in the very next session, a new Senate bill
mirroring Representative Steiger's proposed amendment from the previous
year was proposed as an amendment to RICO, which was by then an enacted
statute. 91 There is certainly some evidence-in the form of testimony-that
the bill "would expand the available civil remedies" because "[niow only the
United States can institute injunctive proceedings. "' And when the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the bill, it noted that the new bill
would supplement RICO's treble-damages provision by "authoriz[ing]
private injunctive relief from racketeering activity."'93 The record of Senate
floor debates on S. 16 contains statements to similar effect. 94 Ultimately,
though, the bill never became law because-although the Senate passed it-
it did not pass the House. 9
5
Somewhat surprisingly, given that one of the episodes failed on
procedural grounds and the other is ex post facto, the court found that "[t]he
clear message from the legislative history is that, in considering civil RICO,
Congress was repeatedly presented with the opportunity expressly to include
187 Id. at 1085-86 (emphasis in original) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35, 346-47
(1970)).
188 Id. at 1086 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 35, 346-47 (1970)).
189 Id. (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35, 363-64 (1970)).
'
90 Id (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35, 296 (1970)).
'91 Id (citing S. 16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Victims of Crime, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee of
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1 st Sess. 3 (1972)).
192 Id (emphasis in original) (citing Victims of Crime, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee of the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1972)) (statement of Richard Velde, Associate
Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
"I Id (quoting 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 29, 368-69 (1972); S. REP.
No. 1070, at 10 (1972)).
194 Id. (citing 118 CONG. REC. 29, 370 (1972) (remarks of Senator McClellan)
(observing that the bill would expand RICO remedies by "authoriz[ing] private
injunctive relief from racketeering activity"); see also S. Rep. No. 1070, at 10
(1972)).
195 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1086.
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a provision permitting private plaintiffs to secure injunctive relief. On each
occasion, Congress rejected the addition of any such provision."'1 96 We'll
return to this conclusion in a bit, but suffice it for now to pass over the finding
of "clarity" with a notation of "not really."
The court then turned to an argument by analogy, finding that "[t]his
clear message is reinforced by recalling that civil RICO was intended to
provide a private cause of action modeled on the analogous provision of the
antitrust laws."' 97 To make this point, the court first returned to legislative
history and established the link between § 1964(c) and § 4.198 The Court then
cited two old antitrust cases for the proposition that § 4 precludes private
injunctive relief, which is available under § 16 of the Clayton Act. 9 9 And
since RICO has no analogue to § 16, Congress must have consciously
declined to bring the antitrust-RICO analogy full circle.200 But for support,
the court referred again to the legislative history discussed above, which
introduces a circularity of another sort.20 '
Finally, the court resorted to the general proposition that courts
should not imply claims and remedies into comprehensive statutory schemes.
But this argument, too, was ultimately grounded in the appeal to legislative
history: "For civil RICO, there are strong indicia of congressional intent
against any implied injunctive relief remedy. Similarly, there is no indication
in the language of section 1964 that civil RICO was not intended, as its plain
wording states, to limit private plaintiffs only to damages, costs, and fees.
Taken together, the legislative history and statutory language suggest
overwhelmingly that no private equitable action should be implied under
civil RICO.
20 2
197 Id
19' Id at 1086-1087. In support the court cited: 116 CONG. REC. 592, 602 (remarks
of Sen. McClellan and Sen. Hruska, respectively); S. REP. NO. 617, 80-82, 125,
160 (1969); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1970, p. 4007; 116 CONG. REC.
35, 295 (Private treble damages provision is "another example of the antitrust
remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality.") (remarks of Rep.
Poff); House Hearings, supra note 176, at 543-44 (testimony of ABA President
Wright); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985). ("The
clearest current in [the legislative] history is the reliance on the Clayton Act
model. ..").
199 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1087 (citing Paine Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Neal, 244 U.S.
459,471 (1917); Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904)).
200 Id
201 Id (noting that [the fact] "[tihat it did not [complete the analogy], despite the
repeated efforts of several members of Congress, strongly suggests that Congress
did not intend to give private civil RICO plaintiffs access to equitable remedies.").
202 Id. at 1088.
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Despite this appeal to the "overwhelming" nature of the evidence
buttressing its conclusion, the court ended on several notes of equivocation:
* "In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that strong
policy arguments can be made to support a right to
injunctive relief for private RICO plaintiffs. 2 °3
* "It may be that in drawing the line between private
equitable relief and private damages, Congress wished
to preclude federal courts from interfering with the day-
to-day running of businesses at the behest of what might
be only a disgruntled competitor. However, this same
concern about anticompetitive litigation has been
frequently leveled at RICO's trebte damages provision.
The Supreme Court, despite expressing sympathy for
this concern, has rejected it as not consistent with the
statute's wording and history." 204
" We recognize the force of the [plaintiff's] argument that
a private injunctive remedy would permit an injured
party to put an immediate stop to racketeering behavior
that threatens his or her business with economic
destruction before the business has been brought to its
knees. While the treble damages remedy is a potent
weapon, it necessarily assumes that economic injury has
occurred. The preventive effect of injunctive relief is
often a more just remedy. Although civil RICO
empowers the government to bring an injunctive suit to
protect a threatened enterprise, we recognize that the
resources of the United States Attorney's office are
limited. Civil RICO deliberately created dual avenues of
enforcement-private and public. We recognize that
precluding enforcing parties from employing the
weapon of equitable relief partially hamstrings the
statute's effect. 'Private attorney general provisions
such as Sec. 1964(c) are in part designed to fill
prosecutorial gaps,' and use of equitable remedies by
private parties would frequently result in substantial
benefits to society generally. These broad social
benefits, such as the dismantling of an illegitimate
enterprise, would generally exceed the gain to the
private plaintiff from this action, especially where the
203 Id.
204 Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1088.
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individual's injury has been ameliorated by treble
damages.2 °5
In the end, the court's opinion stands as an excellent example of the
post-structuralist observation that all texts-especially those with pretentions
to authority-inevitably tend to undermine themselves.2 °6
2. Life after Wollersheim
The flimsy basis of the Ninth Circuit's holding met with outright
hostility a few years later in National Organization For Women, Inc. v.
Scheider, which has grown to serve as the leading counterweight to
Wollersheim.207 There, the court began by anchoring Wollersheim in the early
days of RICO jurisprudence, noting that the Ninth Circuit was the only circuit
court to have directly addressed the issue of RICO injunctions, 20 8 and
emphasizing that Wollersheim reached its conclusion by "relying largely on
[its] reading of the statute's legislative history." 209 From this baseline, the
court concluded that Wollersheim suffered from several deficiencies: "Our
study of Supreme Court decisions since the 1986 Wollersheim opinion
convinces us that the approach of the Ninth Circuit (which relied almost
exclusively on the legislative history of RICO to reach its result, as opposed
to the actual language of the statute) no longer conforms to the Court's
present jurisprudence, assuming for the sake of argument that it was a
",210permissible one at the time. So the court set out to show how the question
could be answered on a purely textual level: "In interpreting the remedial
provisions of the RICO statute, our inquiry begins with the statute's text, and,
205 Id. at 1088-89.
206 See Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 85 J. PHIL. 632, 632 (1988)
(describing the various contradictions in the statement "[oh] my friends, there is no
friend").20 7Nat'l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 699 (7th Cir. 2001),
rev 'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) [hereinafter NOW].
208 According to the Seventh Circuit, the other circuit opinions, pro and con, had
addressed the matter only tangentially and in dicta:
Compare Johnson v. Collins Ent[m't]. Co., 199 F.3d 710, 726
(4th Cir. 1999), In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 828-30 (5th
Cir. 1988), and Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28-29
(2d Cir. 1983) (expressing doubt about availability of injunctive
relief for private plaintiffs), with Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361,
1366 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillan, J., concurring) (suggesting
injunctive relief is available); see also Lincoln House, Inc. v.
Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir. 1990)[;] N[e.] Women's Ctr.
v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1355 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting
controversy but expressing no opinion on resolution).
NOW, 267 F.3d at 695 (emphasis added).
209 Id
210 Id
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if the text is unambiguous, it ends there as well."21' The court began with a
brief summary of the competing interpretive positions. Under the first
position, "[s]ection 1964(a)... grants the district courts jurisdiction to hear
RICO claims and also sets out general remedies, including injunctive relief,
that all plaintiffs authorized to bring suit may seek." '212 Section 1964(b)
provides that the Attorney General will publicly enforce the statute and
"specifies additional remedies, all in the nature of interim relief, that the
government may seek., 213 Section 1964(c) also adds to § 1964(a), but this
time by granting private plaintiffs a right to sue for treble damages. 214 "[T]his
reading of the statute gives the words their natural meaning and gives effect
to every provision in the statute.
215
Taking the court's initial remarks as a pointer to readers, it's not
shocking that-from the outset-the court branded the Wollersheim view "a
less intuitive interpretation." 216 Under that interpretation, § 1964(a) is merely
a jurisdictional grant authorizing district courts to hear civil RICO claims
"and to grant injunctions to parties authorized by other provisions of the law
to seek that form of relief." '217 Section 1964(b), then, allows the Attorney
General to institute RICO proceedings and authorizes the government to seek
the relief stated there, as well as the relief described in § 1964(a). 218 This
leaves § 1964(c) to provide a limited right of action for private parties.219 But
the Wollersheim rubric requires the two clauses of § 1964(c) to be read "as
tightly linked provisions, under which private plaintiffs may sue only for
monetary damages. The mention of this type of relief in the second clause
must mean.., that by implication no other remedies, particularly injunctive
remedies, are available." 220 Because of the linguistic twists required to follow
this interpretive trail, the court declined to "agree that this is a reasonable
reading of the statute" and set out to dismantle Wollersheim step-by- step.221
First, the court suggested that Wollersheim is grounded on a
misreading of § 1964(b).222 This is so because Wollersheim concludes that §
1964(b) explicitly "permits the government to bring actions for equitable
relief. 221 What § 1964(b) actually provides, though, is for the government to
211 Id.
212 Id. at 696
213 NOW 267 F.3d at 696.
214 Id.
215 Id
216 Id.
217 Id.
2 18 NOW, 267 F.3d at 696.
219 Id.
220 I.
221 Id
222 Id
223 NOW, 267 F.3d at 696 (citing Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1082).
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seek a special form of equitable relief-namely, interim relief.224 And since
no one doubts that the government can seek and obtain a permanent
injunction, that authority must come from somewhere else. Where else?
Section 1964(a). Structurally, then, "[t]he sentence '[t]he Attorney General
may institute proceedings under this section' is in that respect the equivalent
of the first clause in § 1964(c), which says '[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter
may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court....' Neither
one addresses what remedy the plaintiff may seek., 225 Cast in this light, "the
government's authority to seek injunctions comes from the combination of
the grant of a right of action to the Attorney General in § 1964(b) and the
grant of district court authority to enter injunctions in § 1964(a), we see no
reason not to conclude, by parity of reasoning, that private parties can also
seek injunctions under the combination of grants in § § 1964(a) and (c)., 226
The Seventh Circuit also challenged the Ninth Circuit's claim that §
1964(a) is purely "jurisdictional" in nature: "What § 1964(a) does is to grant
district courts authority to hear RICO claims and then to spell out a non-
exclusive list of the remedies district courts are empowered to provide in such
cases." 227 To firm up this point, the court analogized § 1964(a) to a "strikingly
similar" statute that the Supreme Court construed in Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).228 In that case, the statute at
issue provided that "[t]he district court shall have jurisdiction in actions
brought under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of
a facility to enforce the requirement concerned and to impose any civil
penalty provided for violation of that requirement. ' '229 The Supreme Court,
operating from the premise that "' [j]urisdiction' . . . is a word of many, too
many, meanings," held that it would be "unreasonable to read [the statute] as
making all the elements of the cause of action under subsection (a)
jurisdictional, rather than as merely specifying the remedial powers of the
court, viz., to enforce the violated requirement and to impose civil
penalties., 23' The Seventh Circuit found that this rationale is just as
applicable to RICO and that, therefore, § 1964(a) both confers jurisdiction on
the district courts and specifies certain remedial powers that the courts will
have in cases brought before them.23'
Once that point was established, the court found that a Wollersheim-
type reading of the statute necessarily collapsed under the pressure of basic
224 ld
225 Id at 697.
226 Id
227 Id.
228 NOW, 267 F.3d at 697.
229 Id (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original).
230 Id (alteration in original).
231 Id
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canons of construction. Under the Wollersheim reading, "injunctive relief is
not available to any particular plaintiff unless it is also provided by some
other section of the statute. This reading renders § 1964(a)'s provision for
injunctive relief a nullity. '232 But "[b]ecause an alternative reading exists
which gives meaning to every section of the statute," the Wollersheim
approach must fail.
233
Finally, with respect to statutory interpretation, the court found that
two sources of interpretive authority validated its approach. First, it noted
that its "interpretation is consistent with Congress's admonition that the
RICO statute is to be 'liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes,' ' 234 an admonition institutionalized in a then-recent series of
Supreme Court cases.235 Second, it suggested that its "interpretation of §
1964 is also in keeping with the underlying purposes of the RICO statute. 236
For as the Supreme Court had already found, Congress, in enacting RICO,
intended to "encourag[e] civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to
deter and penalize the . . . prohibited practices. The object of civil RICO is
232 Id.
233 NOW, 267 F.3d at 697. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Wollersheim's
invocation of the maxim "where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." Id. at 697-98; see also
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)). The court
observed that
While we have no doubt that this is good advice as a general
matter, we do not find it particularly helpful in this case. This is
not a situation in which Congress has provided for a private
damages remedy and has remained silent as to the availability of
injunctive relief. Instead, Congress explicitly provided for
injunctive relief in § 1964(a), although it did not specify in that
section which plaintiffs can seek such relief. Given that the next
two sections describe two types of plaintiffs, the government and
private plaintiffs, and spell out additional remedies specific to
each type, we find that the only logical conclusion is that
Congress intended the general remedies explicitly granted in §
1964(a) to be available to all plaintiffs.
NOW, 267 F.3d at 698.
234 NOW, 267 F.3d at 698; see also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922.
235 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993); Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52, 61-66 (1997); Nat'l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,
256-62 (1994) (rejecting requirement that enterprise have an economic motive);
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). The court also noted the Supreme Court's
position that the liberal-construction clause should have particular force in
construing § 1964 because it is there that "RICO's remedial purposes are most
evident." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10.236 NOW, 267 F.3d at 698.
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thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors,
'private attorneys general,' dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity. 237
The court thus concluded that allowing injunctive relief to private plaintiffs
is fully consistent with the liberal-construction and statutory-purpose
principles surrounding RICO's adoption and prior applications.238
Although the court indicated that it "would be confident resting [its]
holding purely on the plain text of § 1964," it nonetheless felt compelled to
demolish Wollersheim's appeal to legislative history.239 Indeed, in a pointed
swipe, the court suggested a measure of disingenuousness in the Wollersheim
court's analysis: "Perhaps realizing that the plain text of the statute strongly
suggests that private plaintiffs can seek injunctions, the Wollersheim court
relied heavily in its decision on two pieces of legislative history. 240 With
respect to these two "snippets of legislative history," the court observed that
they are at best equivocal on the point of private injunctions and that
contradictory indicia may be found in the legislative history, as Wollersheim
conceded.24' As such, the court concluded that the legislative history did not
constitute the sort of "clearly expressed legislative intent" necessary to "cast
doubt on unambiguous statutory language." '24 2 But more important, even if
the Wollersheim court "made a reasonable decision in 1986 to rely on
Congress's refusal to enact amendments to the statute, recent Supreme Court
precedent teaches that this type of legislative history is a particularly thin
reed on which to rest the interpretation of a statute." 243 So, in accordance with
a more skeptical view of legislative history, the court concluded that the
proffered legislative history could not trump otherwise plain statutory
language.
244
237 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
238 Id.
239 Id at 698.
240 Id at 699.
241 NOW, 267 F.3d at 699.
242 ld. In an opinion issued shortly after NOW, Judge Rakoff opined that-whether
or not the statute is "unambiguous"-Wollersheim gave no reasons to overcome
"the normal presumption favoring a court's retention of all powers granted by the
Judiciary Act of 1789," which includes "equity jurisdiction." Motorola Credit
Corp. v. Uzan, 202 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
243 NOW, 267 F.3d at 699 (citing Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) ("Failed legislative proposals are a
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.
A bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as
many others."); Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)
("Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that
the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.").
244 Id.
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In what the court described as a "last effort" to save the Wollersheim
statutory construction, it examined the argument that structural differences
between RICO and the Clayton Act "demand the inference that no private
right to injunctive relief exists under RICO." '245 This line of argument is based
on the Clayton Act spreading private rights of action across two sections
(damages in § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), injunctions in § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26),
whereas RICO contains only one section addressing private remedies and
that subsection mentions only damages. This gap is taken to mean that
Congress did not intend to allow private-party injunctions. 24 6
The court rejected this line of analysis for three reasons. "First, the
mere fact that the Clayton Act spreads its remedial provisions over a number
of different sections of the U.S. Code, and RICO does not, adds little to our
understanding of either statute., 247 Second, "the Supreme Court regularly
treats the remedial sections of RICO and the Clayton Act identically,
regardless of superficial differences in language., 24' Third, "[s]ince the Court
has already determined that litigants other than the Attorney General may
obtain broad injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, cases like Klehr and
Holmes indicate that we ought to adopt the same interpretation with respect
to RICO. '249 Fourth, a post-Wollersheim Supreme Court case, American
Stores, "(which came to the Court from the Ninth Circuit) pointedly rejected
the way in which the Ninth Circuit had relied on legislative history to limit
the Clayton Act's textual grant of private injunctive relief," thereby
undercutting Wollersheim, "which had used the same methodology as the
discredited American Stores opinion." 250
With all the Wollersheim arguments dispatched to its satisfaction, the
court held that "§ 1964 authorizes injunctive relief at the behest of both the
Attorney General and private plaintiffs, authorizes interim measures when
the Attorney General sues, and authorizes private treble damages only for
private plaintiffs (and not the United States). 25'
As things now stand (i.e., with the Supreme Court yet to weigh in),
courts that are left to decide the question of whether private parties may seek
injunctions essentially have three choices: follow Wollersheim or NOW, or
find a way to avoid the issue. After Wollersheim (and even to date), the
majority of courts to take up the question have followed Wollersheim. But
245 Id.
246 Id. at 699-700.
247 Id. at 700.
248 NOW, 267 F.3d at 700 (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 188-89
(1997) (applying Clayton Act rule for accrual of cause of action to RICO); Holmes
v. SIPC, 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992) (applying proximate cause rule to RICO)).249 Id.
250 Id. (citing California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990)).
251 Id.
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this data point does not mean that a consensus quickly hardened or that there
is now a prevailing view. 2 As one district court recently and astutely noted,
"it is impossible to discern whether these courts chose to follow the Ninth
Circuit's position simply because it was the only pronouncement on this issue
or because the Ninth Circuit's logic is more persuasive than the Seventh
Circuit's. 253 And it's worth noting that a significant fraction of the courts
following Wollersheim were bound to it (because they're in the Ninth
Circuit)2 154 or-though -following Wollersheim on the narrow point of
injunctive relief under § 1964-nonetheless found alternative ways to permit
injunctions in RICO cases.2 15
252 As I already noted, the leading commentator, Professor G. Robert Blakey,
sharply criticized the Wollershiem opinion at the time and has continued the
drumbeat as recently as October 2014, in connection with Chevron v. Donziger.
Brief for Professor G. Robert Blakey as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at * 10,
14, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016) ("This amicus agrees,.
with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Scheidler that private parties have the power
to obtain the full range of equable remedies.... Scheidler is correctly
decided .... ).
253 Huyer v. Wells Fargo & Co., 295 F.R.D. 332, 344 (S.D. Iowa 2013). Of course,
following an institutionalized interpretation is a legitimate tool. See MACCORMICK,
supra note 9. But, as we saw above, it's only one of many.
254 See, Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Aarona v.
Unity House Inc., No. 05- 00197, 2007 WL 1963701 (D. Haw. July 2, 2007);
Holmes High Rustler, LLC v. Gomez, No. 15-cv-02086-JSC, 2015 WL 4999737
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Khan, No. 12-01072-CJC, -
2012 WL 12887395 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Comm. to Protect our Agric. Water
v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., No. 1:15-01323-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 272215
(E.D. Cal. Jan 20, 2017).
255 Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp. 460, 476 (D. Kan. 1988) (noting
that it found Wollersheim persuasive, but the plaintiff also sought injunctive relief
under its common-law claims); Ne. Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342, 1355 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding not to reach the issue of injunctive relief under
RICO because the plaintiff's state-law claims also provided for injunctive relief).
Hawaii's "baby" RICO statute, allowing equitable relief, states:
The circuit courts of the State shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to
divest oneself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to,
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, or ordering dissolution or
reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the
rights of innocent persons.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-8(a) (1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1505(a)
(West 1995) (same); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 607 (1990) (providing a similar
"baby" RICO statute to Hawaii's with slightly different wording); MISS. CODE
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If there was a growing sense in the years after NOWthat Wollersheim
was misguided in its analysis of the RICO statute, the correctness of that
sense was recently confirmed in Chevron v. Donziger.2 56 That case, which
grew out of well publicized claims that an attorney and others had procured
a multi-billion dollar, environmental- damage judgment against Chevron on
behalf of several dozen Ecuadorians through a host of illegal acts, had
resulted in a trial-court judgment that-among other things--enjoined the
defendants from seeking to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment .2 " The Second
Circuit concluded that equitable relief is available under § 1964(c), "largely
for the reasons stated by the Seventh Circuit opinion in NOW L258
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit supplemented the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in a few respects that are worth at least passing notice.
First, the Second Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that §
1964(a) "neither states that any category of persons may not obtain relief that
is within the powers granted to the federal courts nor specifies the persons in
whose favor the courts are authorized to exercise the powers there
granted.2 59 Under this view, then, "Congress did not intend to limit the
court's subsection (a) authority by reference to the identity or nature of the
plaintiff. 26 ° In contrast, under this view, subsections (b) and (c) do limit the
categories of plaintiffs to whom specified relief is available. Subsection (b)
makes "interim relief. . . available only to the United States, not to a private
person. 2 61 Subsection (c) allows a "person" to seek treble damages and
attorneys' fees, and-because the U.S. is not a "person" under RICO's
definition of the term262-the subsection "excludes the federal government
from those to whom a court may award treble damages and attorneys'
fees., 2 63 Accordingly, the court found that subsections (b) and (c) contain
categorical limitations as to whom specified relief is available, but that does
ANN. § 97-43-9 (West 1986) (providing a similar "baby" RICO statute to Hawaii's
with slightly different wording).
256 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016).
257Id at 151.
258 Id. at 137.
259 Id. at 138.
260 Id.
261 Chevron, 833 F.3d at 138.
262 The court's reasoning is that the definition of "person" found in 18 U.S.C. §
1961(3) applies only to "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." Id. (quoting § 1961(3)). Although the United States
can own property, the defined term "person" in § 1964 applies to plaintiffs and
defendants alike, and with there being no indication that Congress intended to
waive sovereign immunity for RICO claims, the United States cannot be a
defendant. Id. Symmetry of interpretation of a term used more than once in a single
statute thus demands that the United States cannot be a plaintiff, either. Id. (citing
United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 879 F.2d 20, 21-27 (2d Cir.
1989) (affirming dismissal of the government's action brought under § 1964(c))).
263 Chevron, 833 F.3d at 138.
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not exclude "relief that federal courts are authorized to grant under subsection
(a)." '264 Were it otherwise, logical absurdities would emerge: e.g., the
Attorney General could obtain temporary-but not permanent-equitable
relief. A more sensible reading, in the court's view, would be to limit the
availability of temporary equitable relief to the United States and, "by parity
of reasoning," to limit the availability of damages to a "person." '2 65 Along the
way, the court made only passing reference to Wollersheim and nary a
mention of legislative history, thus amplifying through silence the Seventh
Circuit's position in NOW that the statute is clear, so considering legislative
history is an error. How is one to explain the Wollersheim-NOW divide?
III. EXPLAINING INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENTS
If the Realists were right that facts decide cases, then it's worth
remarking that Wollersheim was a suit in which the Church of Scientology
sought a RICO injunction barring a splinter church from disseminating
allegedly stolen scriptural materials-hardly the sort of plaintiff or dispute
within RICO's central zone of interest.266 The point is that sometimes courts
choose particular interpretive techniques when they believe something along
the line of, "it just can't be that this statute covers this claim." In such cases,
an inquiry ensues, one typically cast in terms of a search for legislative
"intent" or "purpose." We'll turn to a discussion of what those terms may
mean in a minute, but let's start with a different question: What could make
a judge predisposed to interpret RICO in a way that gives it an expansive
criminal reach, on the one hand, and a narrow civil reach, on the other? The
answer lies, I think, in a public narrative about the rise of organized crime in
America and the government's moves to combat it. We find romanticized
versions in this public narrative threaded through popular novels and films,
from Little Caesar (whose antihero, Rico, may have given RICO its name),
2 67
264 1d at 138-139.
2 65 Id. at 139.
266 In anticipation of a point I'll reach in a minute, there are many instances in case
law in which courts have tacitly adopted social narratives that distinguish
"religions" from "cults." For example, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the
plaintiffs challenged the school's requirement for students to salute the American
flag. The Court described the plaintiffs' parents as being "possessed of
conscientious scruples." See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
597 (1940). Whether that type of social narrative was at work in Wollersheim
remains a matter for speculation. But, at least for me, that eventuality is not
implausible.
267 For decades, there has been speculation that the acronym "RICO" was a nod to
Rico, the gangster protagonist of Little Caesar played by Edward G. Robinson. See
LITTLE CAESAR (Warner Brothers 1931). For more on the relationship between the
film and the statute, see Pames v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21
n.1 (N.D. I11. 1982); G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the
Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform:
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to the Godfather series, to Goodfellas, to more recent offerings like
Boardwalk Empire. And we see the narrative explicitly at play in the deep
background of legislative efforts to curb the influence of mobsters and the
proliferation of their criminal acts. 268
A. Narratives: Large and Small
Before getting to specifics, a few words explaining what I mean by
"narrative" will sharpen the ensuing discussion. Narrative is a broad concept,
one that is currently in such vogue that it loses explanatory significance
without first defining some parameters. Here's what I have in mind: a
narrative is (1) a selective appropriation of past events, evidence, and actors,
(2) a temporal ordering of events and evidence that presents them with a
beginning, middle, and end; and (3) an overarching structure that
contextualizes these events and evidence as part of an opposition or
struggle.269 Thus constituted, narratives exist on multiple planes, ranging
from larger cultural narratives in which whole societies are invested to the
individual narratives that we use to anchor ourselves in the world. Jonathan
Hearn, following Margaret Somers, has developed a useful framework within
which to examine narrative forms and how particular narratives interact.27°
Both Hearn and Somers examine the narratives that individuals and groups
participate in.
They identify several dimensions to narrativity, but I want to focus
on the relationship between just two of them: ontological and public
narratives. Ontological narratives are narratives that individuals use for
making sense of their lives, sometimes by adopting existing ones.271 Hearn
explains that this process often involves 'appropriating and customizing
"public narratives": those narratives attached to cultural and institutional
formations larger than the single individual.272
"Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO? ", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 984-87
(1990).
268 I've recounted the legislative and larger contextual history of organized crime
statutes in Of Gangs and Gaggles. Gordon, Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 1, at
977-79.
2 69 RANDY GORDON, REHUMANIZING LAW: A THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
41(2011).
270 Jonathan Hearn, Narrative, Agency, and Mood: On the Social Construction of
National History in Scotland, 44 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 745 (2002);
Margaret R. Somers, The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and
Network Approach, 23 THEORY& Soc'y 605 (1994).
271 Gordon, supra note 269, at 44; see also Somers, supra note 267, at 618 ("These
are the stories that social actors use to make sense of-indeed, to act in-their
lives.").
272 Heam, supra note 267, at 748.
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Thus conceived, apublic narrative might trace the ups and downs of
families like the Kennedys; or the rise of America as a global power; or
periods of widespread fear or prosperity. For example, a long string of
commentators have observed that American identity is built around a "story
of origins." '27 3 By this they mean "the story of the men, documents, and events
that we celebrate on the Fourth of July"-the Founding Fathers, the
Declaration, and the Constitution. The Constitution plays an especially
important role in the narrative in that it solidifies "a frame of reference for
understanding the 'Americanism' of people who regard themselves as
American." Of course this story is as much a story of exclusion as inclusion
and has fostered endless deconstructions unmasking the institutionalized
hierarchies that undergird it. Our mission is not to wade into the critical
stream flowing around that particular narrative but rather to emphasize that
all interpreters come to an interpretive task invested in public narratives of
one sort or another and those narratives color the lens through which the
interpreter views the object of interpretation.
Bernard Jackson illustrates how social narratives come in to play in
legal contexts, especially that ofjury trials.274 He starts from the premise that
narrative is a major form of cultural communication and is the mode in which
value judgments are stored and transmitted. Because of this, "[m]any of our
value judgments are expressed through modes and degrees of approval or
disapproval of narrativised models of action. Thus, the facts in a case are
presented by the prosecution in the form of a story whose action is known to
be disapproved, while the defence presents an alternative story, where the
action is differently evaluate., 2 75 These stories that we all carry around
should not be understood as being as detailed as plays or movie scripts but
rather as basic structures capable of supporting a range of concrete scenarios.
At trial, the successful advocates' craft is to hang selected facts onto an
implicitly recognized narrative form that leads the jury to find facts and reach
a verdict that weighs one way rather than another.
Of course lay jurors are not the only legal actors with a stock of social
knowledge. So do judges. Jackson poses a problem of interpretation that is
instructive: a historian of ancient law is examining a rule that he thinks he
understands, and he undertakes to discover the "origins" of the rule.276 Is the
rule derived from previous rules of the same system? Or is it a transplant
from a foreign system? Making this determination entails application of a
273 GARY MINDA, Crossing the Literary Modernist Divide at Century's End, in
LAW AND LITERATURE 321, 325 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D. E. Lewis
eds., 1999).
274 BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 61-88 (Roby:
Deborah Charles,
1988).
275 Id.
276 Id
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methodology that relates the problem to general theories of how law
develops. "But such methodological discussion should not conceal from us
the fact that judgments on such matters are informed by narrative
structures., 277 Our historian has a stock of narratives telling in one
developmental way or the other (what Jackson calls the "semantic" level) and
another suggesting scenarios under which one might expect success in
persuading others that his evaluation of the problem is correct (the
"pragmatic" level). The answer that he ultimately supplies to the question
presented will thus be a consequence of what he believes about how the world
operates and what he decides is the most efficacious way to present his
conclusion.
A judge facing a novel question of statutory interpretation faces a
challenge of the same order. What are the origins of this statute? Why does
it exist? And, equally important, how do I justify my interpretation? As a
working hypothesis, I want to suggest that a court may interpret a statute in
keeping with a socially received public narrative regarding the statute's
purpose and then justify that interpretation with a seemingly consistent
narration of legislative history. With that hypothesis in mind, let's look at
some elements of RICO's legislative history. After that, I'll return (as the
just- posed questions suggest) to the notion ofjudge-as-historian.
B. RICO's History
As early as the 1940s, newspaper and magazine articles, as well as
local crime commissions, warned that a national crime syndicate was seizing
control of America's major cities.278 At the time, there were few federal
options-and much appetite-for attacking organized crime. 27 9 Taking up
the challenge, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee introduced a resolution
in 1950 authorizing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate interstate,
organized criminal activities.2 80 This committee ultimately issued four
reports, which confirmed the existence of criminal syndicates and their
pattern of corrupting state and local government. 28 ' But the committee's
proposed legislative solutions went nowhere at the time.282
The story picks up again in earnest in 1967 with the report of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
277 Id. at 168.
278 Guide to Senate Records: Ch. 18 1946-68, NAT'L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter- 18-1946-1968.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2017).
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id
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(popularly known as the Katzenbach Commission). 283 This report
memorializes the public narrative that was then gelling around the social
problems attributable to organized crime. As President Nixon told Congress,
"[O]rganized crime has deeply penetrated broad segments of American life.
In our great cities, it is operating prosperous criminal cartels. In our suburban
areas and smaller cities, it is expanding its corrosive influence." 284 The
problem was essentially threefold. First, organized criminals have a "virtual
monopoly of illegal gambling, the numbers racket, and the importation of
narcotics. '285 Second, the proceeds of these illicit acts give these criminals
the power and resources to underwrite criminal businesses like loansharking,
to "infiltrate and corrupt organized labor," and to increase "its enormous
holdings and influence in the world of legitimate business."2 86 Third,
although "the 26 families of La Cosa Nostra" had been subject to multiple
prosecutions, "not a single one of the 24 Cosa Nostra families have been
destroyed" and the Mafia chieftains had "been notoriously successful in
'getting off' even in those relatively few cases in which the evidence has
warranted the prosecution." '87 To ameliorate this situation, anti-racketeering
hawks offered
a bill which has been carefully drafted to cure a number of
debilitating defects in the evidence-gathering process in
organized crime investigations, to circumscribe defense
abuse of pretrial proceedings, to broaden Federal jurisdiction
over syndicated gambling and its corruption where interstate
commerce is affected, to attack and to mitigate the effects of
racketeer infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting
interstate commerce, and to make possible extended terms
of incarceration for the dangerous offenders who prey on our
288
society.
This bill, which found final expression in the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, aimed to cure "defects" in existing law of the sort we
just reviewed.2 89 Accordingly, eight titles of the OCCA deal with the
difficulties associated with prosecuting members of organized crime, one
283 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & I, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 666 (1987) ("The legislative history of RICO begins with the
report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice (the Katzenbach Commission) in 1967.").
284 S. Doc. No. 91-617 (1969) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 91-105, at 1-3 (1969)).
285 I[d
286 Id
287 116 CONG. REC. 585-86 (1970).
288 Id at 585.
289 See id. (discussing various issues related to organized crime and the inability to
effectively prosecute such individuals responsible but insulated from liability).
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federalizes criminal law relating to illegal gambling,290 one creates a
commission to evaluate the effectiveness and constitutionality of federal
criminal laws and practices, 291 one deals with explosives (a late addition with
little apparent connection to the rest of the act),292 and one, Title IX, is
RICO. 2 9 3
If we set the crime-commission and legislative-committee crime
reports from the mid-to-late 1960s alongside the OCCA, we see that the
major objects of concern repeatedly articulated in the reports-prosecution
difficulties, illegal gambling, andinfiltration of legitimate businesses-map
quite nicely onto the structure of the OCCA. With respect to Title IX, as of
January 21, 1970, it was entitled "Corrupt Organizations" and said to
"[p]rohibit[] infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers or proceeds
of racketeering activities where interstate commerce is affected[, and]
[a]uthorize[] civil remedies comparable to anti-trust to prevent violation of
law by divestiture, dissolution or reorganization." '294 Plenty of other
legislative materials echo this anti-infiltration theme: "Section 1962
establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at stopping the infiltration of
racketeers into legitimate organizations.""29 Title TX "has as its purpose the
elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce. "296
In this respect, then, RICO is in sync with the public narrative as
expressed in the various legislative and crime-commission reports and
executive branch commentary. This could mean that RICO's purpose may be
narrower than one might assume. No one doubts that its net is fine enough to
catch groups other than the Mafia (e.g., Hell's Angels or the Irish Mob) 297 _
i.e., it's not just an anti-Mafia statute. 298 There's good reason, though, to think
that despite the relatively narrow scope of RICO within the larger OCCA, its
new remedies would attack the roots of organized criminal organizations and
prevent their regeneration. Remember, despite the best efforts of prosecutors,
290 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 936-40
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006)).
291 Id. at 960.
292 116 CONG. REC. S952 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 841-848 (2006)).
293 Id. at 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968 (2006)).
294 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 591 (1969).
295 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 57 (1970).
296 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969) (expressing concern about "subversion of
legitimate organizations," "infiltration of legitimate businesses," and "takeover of
legitimate unions").
297 116 CONG. REC. 503, 586 (1970).
298 Although the idea was abandoned on Constitutional grounds, there was
discussion in the House about creating a status offense based on membership in the
Mafia. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (1982) (discussing legislative
history and congressional intent); see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547
U.S. 451, 471-74 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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"[n]ot a single one of the 'families' of La Cosa Nostra has been destroyed. 2 99
So one aim of RICO was to "remove the leaders of organized crime from
their sources of economic power."300 "Instead of their positions being filled
by successors no different in kind, the channels of commerce can be freed of
racketeering influence."
30 1
There is thus a non-frivolous argument that the courts were wrong to
extend RICO's reach beyond the corruption and infiltration of legitimate
organizations. But as infomercial hosts inevitably say in hawking their
products, "That's not all!" For as the passages we just reviewed show, there
are plainly references in the legislative history to RICO having a broad
"commercial" purpose. For example, as late as July 1970, legislative
materials continued to stress the analogy to antitrust law: "Title IX, dealing
with racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, was modeled on the
[American Bar Association's] 1968 resolution endorsing 'in principle' all
legislation having as its purpose 'the adopting of the machinery of antitrust
laws to the prosecution of organized crime."' 30 2 And as Justice Thomas
emphasized in his Anza dissent, Congress was concerned about the
illegitimate competitive advantage that racketeers had over their legitimate
rivals:
The sponsor of a Senate precursor to RICO noted that "the
evil to be curbed is the unfair competitive advantage
inherent in the large amount of illicit income available to
organized crime." Upon adding a provision for a civil
remedy in a subsequently proposed bill, Senator Hruska
noted: "[This] bill also creates civil remedies for the honest
businessman who has been damaged by unfair competition
from the racketeer businessman. Despite the willingness of
the courts to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to organized
crime activities, as a practical matter the legitimate
businessman does not have adequate civil remedies
available under that act. This bill fills that gap." A portion of
these bills was ultimately included in RICO, which was
attached as Title IX to the Organized Crime Control Act. The
Committee Report noted that the Title "has as its purpose the
elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce." The observations of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, the source of much of the congressional concern
over organized crime, are consistent with these statements.
299 S. REP. No. 91-617 at 45 (1969).
300 Id. at 80.
301 Id
302 116 CONG. REC. 25190 (1970).
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Its chapter on organized crime noted that "organized crime
is also extensively and deeply involved in legitimate
business . . . . [I]t employs illegitimate methods-
monopolization, terrorism, extortion, tax evasion-to drive
out or control lawful ownership and leadership and to exact
illegal profits from the public." The report noted that "[t]he
millions of dollars [organized crime] can throw into the
legitimate economic system gives it power to manipulate the
price of shares on the stock market, to raise or lower the price
of retail merchandise, to determine whether entire industries
are union or nonunion, to make it easier or harder for
businessmen to continue in business." 30 3
So, at a minimum, there's a tension in RICO's legislative history on
the related questions of RICO's civil reach and its relationship to the antitrust
laws. More specifically, was the language of § 4 of the Clayton Act selected
because it was a handy articulation of the causation standard necessary to
invest a private litigant with standing to pursue an otherwise criminal
violation? Or did this selection signal that the antitrust and RICO acts were
to work in tandem? Both? It's hard to say, but the questions throw us onto
the crisscrossing paths of two teleological inquiries. First, what's the
relationship between the words of the statute and what the adopters of those
words hoped to accomplish with them? Second, how is one to reconcile
RICO's potential as a powerful prosecutorial weapon with a general
reluctance to federalize plain-vanilla commercial and consumer claims?
What we will find, I think, are context-specific formulations of RICO's
"intent" or "purpose" that are observable when courts narrate RICO's
legislative history.
C. What's Intent?
When we ponder the point of a statute, the usual approach is to talk
about "legislative intent" or "statutory purpose," labels that bleed into one
another and that are often disputed.30 4 Some observers posit "intent" as
conceptually narrow (the "idea she sought to transfer using the words she
chose to speak") and "purpose" as broad ("what a legislator imagines or
hopes will change about the world by means of enacting the legislation").3"5
As I've suggested before, on this view, the intent of RICO might be framed
as "locking up people who invest in, muscle in on, or operate enterprises
303 Anza, 547 U.S. at 473-74 (Thomas, J., dissent) (alterations and emphasis in
original).
304 For a helpful survey of the various positions, see Abby Wright, For All Intents
and Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells Us about Congress and Statutory
Interpretation, 154 U. PA. L. REV 983 (2006).
305 See Id at 991-92 (discussing a distinction between intent and purpose).
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through a pattern specified racketeering acts."30 6 The purpose of RICO, by
contrast, might be framed more broadly, perhaps something like "helping
destroy organized crime in the United States."30 7 Now whether Congress is
too complex a social group to have "intents" and "purposes" in a strong sense
is a debate that has raged for decades.30 8 But we're not going to get ensnared
in this debate or in disputes over terminology: what we're interested in is how
courts ascribe an intent to Congress or a purpose to legislation30 9
In MacCormick's view, the "value-based and teleological character"
of statute obliges an interpreter to consider what values and aims "should be
postulated as the telos or end imputed to legislation."3 ' So a rounded
interpretive theory must mark that legislating "is a rational and teleological
activity guided by political programmes structured by some sense of justice
and the common good. 3 11 Quite naturally, then, interpreters make use of
information about the circumstances of particular legislative acts:
[T]hese include commission reports, committee papers, and
the like which identify a mischief and propose possible
remedies for it. The "intention of parliament" plays a proper
role in legislative interpretation, but not because there is a
discoverable state of somebody's mind that can with special
authenticity explain the words used as bearing the meaning
attested by that mental state. On the contrary, it is because
the legislature makes a practice of legislating in English of a
particular register; because rational acts of legislation hang
together in a coherent way internally and in relation to the
306 Gordon, Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 1, at 1024.
307 Id. ("Plainly, undertaking this exercise will not generate single definitive
formulations of intents and purposes.")
308 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) ("Trying
to infer the intentions of an institution composed of 535 members is a notoriously
doubtful business under the best of circumstances."); see also Wright, supra note
304, at 1007-24. The gist of Wright's argument is that Congressional intent can be
divined with respect to particular legislation because of how Congress is structured
and the procedures it follows. This is so even though we know that individual
legislators may not have carefully considered a bill, might be hostile to it, and may
have voted for it for horsetrading reasons. But inferring purpose in the broadest
sense requires resort to extrinsic reasons, which renders any conclusions suspect.
Even though Wright believes that Congress is not an entity capable of forming
purposes, she ultimately states that many arguments based on "purpose" are really
mislabeled "intent" arguments. Id. at 1024. Thus said, my proffered statement of
RICO's purpose may really be an "intent."
309 See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 453 (2005)
[hereinafter Private Language].
310 MACCORMICK, supra note 9, at 134.
311 Id
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rest of the legal system; and because reforms aim to remedy
sensibly some identified deficiency; that one can finally
impute to the legislature an intention that certain words be
understood with a certain meaning rather than another one
that they might bear. "Intention" is a rhetorically effective
and legitimate way to frame a conclusion about what is the
most reasonable interpretation in context, not a further
argument to that effect.3 12
At a very high level of generality, there is no dispute that Congress
"intended" RICO to help root out organized crime. But at more particular
levels, there's much room for genuine argument. What makes "organized"
crime organized?" What do "organized" criminals do? In answer to the first
question, we know that there would be something of a consensus when
talking about the paradigmatic case of the Mafia, a group with initiation rites,
membership criteria, a strictly hierarchical structure, and so forth. Until
Boyle, most courts held that an association-in-fact enterprise within RICO's
reach had to share at least some of these characteristics. But Boyle, which
involved a loosely affiliated and shifting group of bank robbers, moved the
needle far down the organizational spectrum from the Mafia pole. 313 So by
the time we layer on the full range of illegal acts that criminal organizations
undertake (which include items as disparate as providing illegal goods and
services, murdering rivals, bribing public officials, investing dirty money in
legitimate businesses, muscling in on unions, loansharking, hijacking,
fraudulent schemes and more), 314 we're already dealing with a serious
312 Id. at 137. Solan writes to similar effect:
[L]aws are written in language and language can only be
understood in context. The thinking of those who supported and
proposed the law in the first place may not reflect the will of
every legislator, but it can certainly make some contribution to
statutory interpretation if used wisely. At the very least, it can
help us to determine whether the difficulty in applying the statute
results from an unfortunate choice of statutory language to effect
a legislative goal that becomes clear once one investigates the
matter. And it can be used to confirm that decisions made on
other grounds are not likely to fly in the face of what the statute
was intended to accomplish.
Private Language, supra note 309, at 435.
313 Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 941 (2009).
314 For an overview of what organized criminals do, see Lynch, supra note 283, at,
669-70. Indeed, the initial part of the definition of "racketeering activity" in § 1961
signals hard-core criminal acts: "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year. . . ." If the "fraud" predicate acts were
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interpretive dilemma in the context of a statute that's vague to begin with
3 1 5
and that's been construed in ways that have made the matter rather worse.
31 6
It should come as no surprise, then, that ajudge trying to make sense
of a civil RICO claim will form a view as to RICO's purpose, and that view
is likely steeped in the pervasive public narrative that we've been
discussing.3"' This means that-at the personal, ontological level-a judge
will analyze RICO according to the constraints of that public narrative. She
will thus interpret RICO so as to ensure its potency as a prosecutorial weapon
but also-as a collateral matter-assume that the civil dimension of the
statute isn't intended to apply to conduct that doesn't look like gangland
conduct- unless she is in thrall to an overriding theoretical construct (e.g.,
strict textualism) that acknowledges the dominant narrative but nonetheless
rejects it because Congress (perhaps foolishly) chose language broader than
its stated purpose required.3 18 This brings us to our final point: how
stripped out of the statute, it's hard to imagine many civil RICO suits against
legitimate businesses as defendants.
315 For a discussion on the potential constitutional weaknesses and vagueness of
RICO's definition and application, see George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E.
McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process "Voidfor Vagueness " Test, 45 BUS.
LAW. 1003, 1008-10 (1990); Michael S. Kelley, "Something Beyond": The
Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO's Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
331, 380-94 (1991); Jed S. Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 11, 1990, at 3; Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 691, 721-27 (1990); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
255 (1986) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's opinion as
"increas[ing] rather than remov[ing] [RICO's] vagueness").
316 See Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805,
815-17 (1990) (noting that legislative history reflects congressional intent to limit
RICO's application, but these limits have been minimized through expansive
judicial interpretation); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 294
(1983) ("[Slome judges... have strained to adopt broad constructions of RICO"
with the result that "the scope of the RICO statute has been expanded far beyond
what was intended by Congress.").
317 See generally, N. ALLOTT & B. SHAER, Legal Speech and the Elements of
Adjudication, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 194 (Brian Slocum, ed.,
2017).
"' See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 473-74 (2006)(Thomas, J.,
dissent)
Justice Thomas argued that the Court's majority limited the
lawsuits that may be brought under the civil enforcement
provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp.
Il1), by adopting a theory of proximate causation that is
supported neither by the Act nor by our decision in Holmes...,
on which the Court principally relies. The Court's stringent
proximate-causation requirement succeeds in precluding
recovery in cases alleging a violation of § 1962(c) that, like the
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legislative history can be (re)constructed in ways that nudge it into phase with
the "gangster" social narrative and thereby make legislative purpose seem
self-evident.
Victoria Nourse has articulated a sensible way of thinking about
legislative history, its uses, and its relationship to notions of legislative intent
and purpose.319 She frames her discussion within a decades-old debate
between textualists and purposivists and suggests that neither group
adequately defines what it means by "legislative history," which has reduced
the utility of what happens in the legislative process to an all-or- nothing
proposition.32 First, she draws distinctions among statutory history (the
evolution of the text of a statute as it meanders through the process), statutory
usage (the semantic content of the text as commonly understood by
legislators), and public documents bearing institutional sanction (e.g.,
committee reports).321 So instead of legislative "history," she asks us to
consider legislative "context," in all these various forms.3 22
Second, she debunks the notion (the origin of which she associates
with the Realist Max Radin) that legislatures can't have "intents" or
purposes. Here, too, she suggests a change in nomenclature, preferring
to focus instead on legislative "decisions."324 This is actually more than a
change in diction because it suggests that a focus on particular moments of
decision will yield insights superior to those generated after "roaming
around" in legislative materials without due regard to legislative
procedures.325 To do otherwise, she suggests, increases the risk of "fantasy
narratives" that "impos[e] coherence on a tale never meant to be coherent. 326
I don't read her to say, though, that the "zigs and zags" of the
legislative process somehow render legislative history unnarratable. Of
course it can be narrated (as can the history of anything): this happened, then
that happened, then some other things happened, then the bill finally passed
into law. And this narrative need not be strictly linear, either: zigging and
zagging through time is a hallmark of the Modernist novel. Indeed, Gerard
Genette's (a literary theorist whom Nourse cites) masterwork, Narrative
Discourse, is an attempt to chart the temporal flows and eddies of Marcel
present one, have nothing to do with organized crime, the target
of the RICO statute.
319 Victoria Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative
Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REv. 1613 (2014).320 Id. at 1614-1615.
321 Id. at 1616 ("Both textualism and purposivism are poorer for failing to parse
these different meanings of legislative history.").
322 Id at 1616.
323 Id. at 1621-25.
324 Nourse, supra note 318 at 1621-1625.
325 Id. at 1648-50.
326 Id. at 1649.
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Proust's Search for Lost Time.327 All Nourse "intends" to say, I think, is that
courts shouldn't narrate legislative history (1) without an eye to legislative
process and an understanding of what is important and what is trivial and (2)
by cherry-picking zigs and zags and thereby creating what amounts to fiction,
in the sense of unfairly representing "what really happened."
Yet the question remains, why do courts so often resort to legislative
history as an interpretive aid? The answer, I think, lies in the nature of
narrative. All historical narratives are, as I've argued before, partial in both
senses, and the result of selective appropriation of evidence and events. But
a coherent narrative can carry great rhetorical-and in the context of a legal
decision, justificatory-weight. Indeed, there's a good argument to be made
that the coherence of a narrative and its plausibility (and attendant rhetorical
success) are closely related.328 So it's no surprise that ajudge who comes to
the moment of decision with a preconception of a statute's purpose would
narrate that statute's history in a way that unerringly demonstrates that
purpose and only that purpose. What's interesting here is not that the use of
legislative history is more pernicious than other interpretive tools; it's just
that a close reading of the narrative construction, the selective appropriation,
reveals traces of the pre-judgment that guided the selection of legislative
evidence to establish a fact of the matter.
Legal narratives, which include narrations of legal history, are not
different in kind from other types of narratives; to the degree they are
different, it is only because they are made according to a particular set of
conventions, a point that Ian Watt made long ago in examining the contours
of the "realistic" novel.3 29 Does a conventional formula lead to truth, to a fact
of the matter? Suffice it to say that Watt sees it as an open question ("formal
realism is, of course, like the rules of evidence, only a convention"),3 3 ° and
Jackson sees even greater potential problems ("the construction of fact in the
courtroom is comparable to the construction of plausibility of much narrative
fiction.").33 ' So we need to proceed cautiously.
327 GERARD GENETTE, NARRATIVE DISCOURSE: AN ESSAY IN METHOD (Jane E.
Lewin trans., Comell Univ. Press 1983). In an analysis of a passage from Proust's
abandoned novel, Jean Santeuil, Genette describes the temporal positions as "a
perfect zigzag." Id. at 38.
328 See JACKSON, supra note 278, at 73 (discussing Bennett and Feldman's account
of fact construction).
329 Ian Watt, Realism and the Novel Form, in LAW AND LITERATURE 463, 463-64
(Lenora Ledwon ed., 1996).330 Id. at 464.
331 See JACKSON, supra note 278, at 73.
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When we speak of legislative history and whether it can conclusively
establish a fact-of-the-matter, Paul Veyne's description of how all history is
(re)constructed seems apt. In his view,
History is an account of events: all else flows from that.
Since it is a direct account, it does not revive, any more than
the novel does. The actual experience, as it comes from the
hands of the historian, is not that of the actors; it is a
narration, so it can eliminate certain erroneous problems.
Like the novel, history sorts, simplifies, organizes, fits a
century into a page. This synthesis of the account is not less
spontaneous than that of our memory when we call to mind
the last ten years through which we have lived.332
History is a synthesis and a condensation; furthermore, it is tainted by
perspective: it is not unmediated "fact" and this is so even for direct actors,
whose memories and perceptions are never more than partial:
To speculate on the interval that always separates the actual
experience and the recollection of the event would simply
bring us to see that Waterloo was not the same thing for a
veteran of the Old Guard and for a field marshal; that the
battle can be related in the first or third person; that it can be
spoken of as a battle, as an English victory, or as a French
defeat; that from the start one can drop a hint of the outcome
or appear to discover it. These speculations can produce
amusing experiments in aesthetics; to the historian, they are
the discovery of a limit.333
Legislative history-because it is history-is a present
reconstruction of past events. It thus suffers from the same limitations as all
history: it is based on an incomplete record, which could have been
manipulated at the time; it can be manipulated or distorted through present
acts of interpretation; and, most important, it is a narrative. On this view,
even though Professor Blakey---or any other "insider" for that matter- may
have had a privileged vantage from which to observe (and perhaps shape) the
birth of RICO, his is still only a perspective, and an inevitably limited one at
that:
33 4
332 PAUL VEYNE, WRITING HISTORY: ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY 4 (Mina Moore-
Rinvolucri trans., Wesleyan Univ. Press 1984).
333 Id.
334 Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary "when the
Subcommittee processed the legislation that became RICO in 1969 and 1970."
Brief for G. Robert Blakey as Amici Curiae, supra note 252.
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That limit is that in no case is what historians call an event
grasped directly and fully; it is always grasped incompletely
and laterally, through documents or statements, let us say
through tekmeria, traces, impressions. Even if I am a
contemporary and a witness of Waterloo, even if I am the
principal actor and Napoleon in person, I shall have only a
perspective of what historians will call the event of
Waterloo; I shall be able to leave to posterity only my
statement, which, if it reaches them, they will call an
impression. Even if I were Bismarck deciding to send the
Ems dispatch, my own interpretation of the event would
perhaps not be the same as that of my friends, my confessor,
my regular historian, and my psychoanalyst, who may have
their own version of my decision and think they know better
than I do what it was I wanted. In essence, history is
knowledge through documents. Thus, historical narration
goes beyond all documents, since none of them can be the
event; it is not a documentary photomontage, and does show
the past "live, as if you were there." '335
In the context of civil RICO, these problems are especially acute
because "RICO's legislative history is more ambiguous than the statute."
3 3 6
Thus, depending on the issue to be argued, a sophisticated advocate can state
that, on the one hand, (1) "the antitrust analogy is unpersuasive, since it does
not take into account the significant structural and language differences
between the antitrust statutes and civil RICO" and "a reading of civil RICO
in light of the lawyers' fallacy, which mistakenly believes that the same
words have the same meaning without regard to context of time and place,
33 7
and, on the other hand, that (2) through "RICO's model in the anti-trust laws
... ICongress in 1970 achieved a remarkable integration between the anti-
trust statutes and RICO in protecting the free market place." '338 This confirms,
at least with respect to RICO, that citing legislative history is like "looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends"--the qualification being that your
friends may change from time to time.339 So, as we saw in Wollershein, the
court "picked out some friends" and narrated RICO's legislative history in a
way that justified its refusal to extend the benefits of RICO to an outlier
religious organization on what seemed like, at best, a misappropriation claim
of some sort.
335 VEYNE, supra note 334, at 4-5.
336 Blakey & Cessar, supra note 30, at 549.
337 ld. at 554-555.
338 Brief for G. Robert Blakey as Amici Curiae, supra note 252, at 8-9.
319 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (referring to an oft-
quoted observation of Judge Harold Leventhal).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In his landmark Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Neil
MacCormick opens the final chapter by quoting the bit from Gulliver's
Travels in which the Lilliputians describe in meticulous detail the "wonderful
kind of engine" hanging from a "great Silver Chain" attached to Gulliver's
waistcoat. We know this to be a watch, but the Lilliputians don't have the
requisite "social knowledge" to know what the "engine" is for. This Article
suggests that judges have-in addition to legal knowledge-"social
knowledge" that they consciously or unconsciously draw upon in performing
the act ofjudging. And they do so inevitably, as do all humans. This is not a
"problem" to be "solved" but rather an observation that should cue readers
ofjudicial opinions to search for textual clues that may reveal the underlying
beliefs that are informing-in some cases driving-the decision in any
particular case. Unlike the Lilliputians who can "read" Gulliver only from an
external perspective, we can assume an internal perspective and see "what's
really going on."
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